Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Downtown Athletic Club v. S. M. Horman : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
L. R. Gardiner; Fox, Edwards & Gardiner; Attorneys for Respondent.
Lorin N. Pace, G. Randall Klimt, William B. Parsons; Pace, Klimt, Wunderli & Parsons; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, No. 860109.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/906

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A1Q

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NO. JSIrO I ^ H ^ E

DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
S. M. HORMAN, an individual, a/k/a
SID HORMAN, S. M. HORMAN & SONS,
a Partnership, and S. M. HORMAN &
SONS COMPANY,

8bO I D^-CA.
C a s e No.

20533

Defendants.
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff
and Respondent,
vs.
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH,
an individual,
Counter-Defendants and
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT
OF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE DAVID B. DEE, JUDGE

L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
American Plaza II - Suite 400
57 West 200 South
P.O. Box 3450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3450
Telephone (801) 521-7751
Attorneys for Defendants
Respondant

Lorin N. Pace #2498
G. Randall Klimt #1839
William B. Parsons #2535
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI AND PARSONS
University Club Building, Suite 1200
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300
Attorneys for Plaintiffs - Appellant

JUfU 21835

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUBf a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
S. M. HORMAN, an individual, a/k/a
SID HORMAN, S. M. HORMAN & SONS,
a Partnership, and S. M. HORMAN &
SONS COMPANY,

Case No. 20533

Defendants.
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,
Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff
and Respondent,
vs.
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH,
an individual,
Counter-Defendants and
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT
OF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE DAVID B. DEEr JUDGE

L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
American Plaza II - Suite 400
57 West 200 South
P.O. Box 3450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3450
Telephone (801) 521-7751
Attorneys for Defendants
Respondant

Lorin N. Pace #2498
G. Randall Klimt #1839
William B. Parsons #2535
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI AND PARSONS
University Club Building, Suite 1200
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300
Attorneys for Plaintiffs - Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

POINT I

PLAINTIFF, THROUGH COUNSEL, WAS NOT GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY TO ADEQUATELY
RESPOND TO DEFENDANT' S AFFIDAVITS OF FACT

12

ALL POINTS CITED AS CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE
VALIDITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND LEASE AGREEMENT
HAVE BEEN FACTUALLY CONTROVERTED AND THERE ARE
QUESTIONS OF FACT ON EACH OF THOSE CITED POINTS

14

POINT III ALL POINTS CITED TO SHOW THAT THE PURPORTED ORAL
LEASE IS NOT VALID HAVE BEEN CONTROVERTED IN THE
RECORD

14

POINT II

POINT IV

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY ONLY BE GRANTED WHERE THERE
IS NO ISSUE OF FACT

CONCLUSIONS

15
ADDENDUM

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

15

Contract of Construction and Lease
Yurth Affidavit
Curinga Affidavit
Clissold Affidavit
Petition for Extraordinary Review
Motion for Continuance
Affidavit of Counsel
Memorandum Opinion
Summary Judgment

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cited
1.

Auerbach v. Kimball - Utah 1977
572 P.2d 376

Page 13

2.

Cox v. Winters - Utah 1984
678 P.2d 311

Page 13

3.

Burningham v. Ott - Utah 1974
525 P.2d 620

Page 15

4.

Carr v. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co. - Utah 1970
464 P. 2d 580, 23 Ut. 2d 415

Page 15

5.

Singleton v. Alexander - Utah
431 P. 2d 126; 19 Ut. 2d 292

Page 15

6.

Fredrick May & Co. v. Dunn - Utah 1962
368 P.2d 266; 13 Ut. 2d 40

Page 15

7.

Bowen v. Riverton City - Utah
656 P.2d 434

Page 15

2

STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.
hear

the

Whether
Motion

the decision of the lower court to preceed to
for Summary

Judgment

on

November

notwithstanding pending and incomplete discovery,

16, 1984

was prejudiced

and an abuse of discretion.
2.
deposition

Whether
cited

facts

alleged by Plaintiff's

in opposition to Motion for

affidavit

Summary

and

Judgment

raised issues of fact when reviewed most favorably to Plaintiff.
3.

Whether
1985

the Summary Judgment dated the

day of

should be set aside and the case remanded

for

seeks to have the Summary Judgment set aside

and

trial.
Plaintiff

the case remanded for trial.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
Horman
space
old

Yurth (President of Plaintiff) held discussions with Mr.
who

vacant

office

on the second floor of the Keith Warshaw Building,

or the

Kress

promotion
pp.77,
M.

eventually allowed Mr.

Building
of

as it

&

"Construction
Club."

historically

the Downtown Athletic

78 & 79) On May 8,

Horman

was

Yurth to use

Sons Co.
and

(Exhibit

Club.

(Yurth

11,

to

begin

deposition,

1981, the Plaintiff and Defendant S.

executed a written

Lease

known,

Agreement for
Yurth

the

instrument

entitled

Downtown

Athletic

deposition.)

This

instrument

incorporated the prior understanding that Plaintiff could utilize
office

space in the old Kress Building for payment of one dollar

per month rent.

(Paragraph V A,

pp.

3-4, Exhibit 11 to Yurth

deposition.)
2.
the

Plaintiff

Construction

agreement

to

and Defendant entered into a modification
and Lease Agreement by

assign

Harver

warehouse.

funds,

accepts

the Defendant's underlying

While

bids,

including

Plaintiff

draft plans,

financing

in the proposed club,

Plaintiff

to quit the premises.

therein

lease

was continuing
sell memberships

in

to

of
an
the

expend

and

Defendant served notice on

seek
the

Plaintiff filed the lawsuit to

protect his rights in the contract.
3.

The Construction and Lease Agreement was executed by the

parties on or about May 8,

1981, and included, among others, the

following material conditions and requirements:

4

a.
Building,

For

the

per month.

occupancy "of the office space" in

the

Plaintiff was required to pay rent of One

(Paragraph V A,

p.

Kress
Dollar

3, of the Construction and Lease

Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition;

Yurth deposition, p.

77; Horman deposition, p. 193. )
b.
Horman

&

The

Sons

"provided

improvements] to be made by Defendant

Co.

under that agreement were to be

Lake

made

only

that the Harver Building can be reinforced at a

that is acceptable to Lessor [Defendant] and Lessee
and

S. M.

price

[Plaintiff],

in a manner which will satisfy the requirements of the
City Building Department."

(Paragraph III A,

p.

Salt

2 of the

Construction and Lease Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition;
Yurth deposition, p. 159. )
c.
was

Construction by Defendant S.

M.

Horman & Sons Co.

to commence only after "confirmed receipt and acceptance

by

Lessor [Defendant] of construction financing acceptable to Lessor
[Defendant],"

and the entire lease was specifically "subject

Lessor

[Defendant]

being able to secure

Lessee

[Plaintiff] would

(Paragraphs IV and VI F,

sufficient

pay any interest in

to

financing.

excess

of 12%.

pp. 3, 5, of the Construction and Lease

Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition.)
d.
construction
sell

a

Lessor
under

sufficient

[Defendant] was required to
the agreement only if the
number of

Plaintiff

memberships...to

payments required by this contract will be paid"
p.

3, of

the Construction and Lease Agreement,

Yurth deposition.)
5

proceed

with
"shall

guarantee
(Paragraph

that
IV,

Exhibit 11 to

e.
income

in

according

Lessee
a

[Plaintiff] was required "to

sufficient

amount

to

guarantee

assign

said

dues

payments

to individual membership contracts by contract

number

to a special account designated solely for the payment of monthly
lease payments due and payable under this lease."
p.

3, of the Construction and Lease Agreement,

(Paragraph IV,
(Exhibit 11

to

Yurth deposition; Yurth deposition, p. 83.))
4.
to

Up through June 7,

1983, the Defendants did not object

nor seek to terminate the Construction and

Defendant

was

property;

receiving

lower

benefits

insurance

in

rates

the
and

Lease Agreement.
protection

protection

of

the

against

vandalism. (Yurth Affidavit).
5.
had

Plaintiffs learned in November, 1983, that the Defendant

entered into a contract with Salt Lake Aquisition Group

sale of the property.

for

In order to sell it would be necessary to

terminate the Construction and Lease Agreement - hence the notice
to quit.
6.
Group

A

was

record
filed

of
in

the contract with ScLlt Lake
the Salt

Lake

County

Acquisition

Recorder's

office

effectively making financing impossible.
7.

Defendant had noticed up its motion for summary judgment

to be heard at 8:30 A.M. on November 16, 1984. (R. 387)
8.

Present

counsel was retained only 24 hours prior to the

hearing (R. 388)
9.

Counsel

filed a petition for extraoridinary review

and

request for additional time to respond to and argue in opposition

6

to motion for summary judgment. (R. 387) That motion was denied.
However,

the

court

gave leave to file a memorandum

within

20

days. (R. 386)
10.

Defendant

in

affidavits of Brent R.
311),

L.

R.

support

summary

judgment

cited

Dyer (R. 285)f George J. Throckmorton (R.

Gardiner Jr.

Sherman Gilman (R.

of

(R.

402), Scott R. Evans (R. 290 ) f

319), Steven D, Petersen (R. 297). Further,

the deposition of Sidney Horman was extensively cited.
11.

Many of the persons named were complete strangers to the

Plaintiff and Plaintiff desired to take their depositions.
12.

Upon

receipt of notice of deposition of

Sidney

Horman

[Defendant]f Defendant's counsel responded saying:
With respect to the depositions you have noticed, it is
my understanding of the Judge's ruling that any further
discovery necessarily awaits his ruling on the motion
for summary judgment.
Should that motion be granted,
there would, of course, be no further discovery. If the
motion should be deniedf I shall be pleased to cooperate
with you in setting dates.
(Your notices conflict with
other depositions previously scheduled by me, and I
would not be able to accomodate you on those dates in
any event.)(R. 434)
13.

Plaintiff

submitted

an

affidavit in

support

of

its

motion for extraordinary review.(R. 570) Said affidavit (R. 576)
alleged the need to take the deposition of nine persons.
of

deposition

Citiwood,

were served on Roger

Evans, Bill

William Oswald and Sid Horman.(R.

Notices

Selvig, Mike

579, R. 581 through

R. 587)
Defendant would not make himself available for deposition as
is shown above.

7

14.

In Defendants1 supporting affidavits,

Defendant alleges

that there were conditions precedent necessary to the validity of
the

contract

and

that the conditions precedent

had

not

been

performed.
The facts that Defendant relies on were:
a.
rental

The

Plaintiff

required

office space.
b.

The

did

not pay the one

dollar

for the temporary occupancy of

Kress

month

Building

(Horman deposition, p. 140.)
purported receipt (R.

310) for monthly rent of the

temporary facility supposedly signed by Defendant S.
as agent for S.
the

per

M.

Horman & Sons Co.,

M., Horman,

filed with this Court by

Plaintiff in support of its "Motion for Court to Fix

Amount

of Counter Bond," was forged by the Plaintiff and was not

signed

by

Horman

Mr.

Horman.

(Affidavit of George J.

Throckmorton;

deposition, p. 186.)
Response.

Response

Throckmorton affidavit,
12) See Addendum.

to

a.

& b.

see receipt

David Yurth affidavit (R.

attached

455 paragraph

David Yurth categorically affirmed that

payment was made.
Q.
Now, at that time as I get the picture from this
thing, you paid Mr. Horman in advance $100 as advance
rent for that; is that correct?
A.
did.

That was what I said I would do and that is what I

Q.
Okay.
And was this — I don't know tha nature of
this, but was this supposed to be a receipt from him?
A.
I drafted this speed memo and took it in with $100
and left it on his secretary's desk with a message that
this is what we agreed to do and I went back in the
subsequent day and got my copy that had been signed and
took it with me and put it in the record.
8

to

the

Note

- Plaintiff

Throckmorton.
c.

not

had

an

opportunity

to

depose

David Yurth denies that the document is a forgery.

The

acceptable

has

Harver Building could not be reinforced at a
to the Lessor [Defendant].

(Horman

price

deposition, p.

152; Yurth deposition, p. 194. )
d.

The

only engineering studies performed with respect

which any report was given showed that the Harver Building
not

be

made

purpose.
e.

could

the

intended

completed

drawings

(Yurth deposition, pp. 165-167 and 194.)
No

providing
Building
building.
the

structurally sound economically for

to

written
for

were

engineering studies or

adequate structural reinforcement of
submitted

to

or approved

(Affidavit of Scott R.

Department

any

plans

the Harver
for

this

Evans, Assistant Director of

of Building and Housing Services for

Salt

Lake

City Corporation).
Response.

Response to c, d & e: Yurth Deposition 167, 168.

A.
Bill Smith was of the opinion that — and expressed
his opinion openly to me in meetings with Sidney and in
meetings that I had with him on the building that it
could not be used in its current state and that it would
have to be reinforced by a steel reinforcing system and
and it was going to cost $150,000 a floor and so on.
When that representation was first made to me, it
was a cause of considerable concern and it was the
reason why we engaged Bonneville Engineering in the
first place.
It was subsequently established by virtue
of the meetings which I had with Mr. Smith and with Mr.
Talbot and conversations which were had between my
architects and Mr. Talbot had not conducted that study
nor produced the results of that study entirely on his
own or with entire objectivity and it was my contention
then and it is still my contention that the results of
the study were purposely skewed to show that there was
more structural reinforcement needed and more cost to be
required than we could absorb in our construction so
9

that the Construction and Lease Agreement would never
result in the thing being built.
(Yurth Affidavit
paragraphs 7, 8 & 9 (R. 453, 454)
The
which
have

affidavit of Scott Evans outlines the engineering

was performed.
been

Addendum.
f.

work

Plaintiff and Scott Evans believe

adequate

for

the purposes

of

the

it to

contract.

See

(R. 474-477)
The

Defendant

(Lessor) did

construction

financing

acceptable

not

to the

receive

or

Lessor

accept

[Defendant].

(Horman deposition, pp. 125-126. )
Response.
that

The

interest

[Plaintiff].
Agreement.

Agreement

in

See

excess

itself in paragraph

of

12% will

paragraph VI.

Addendum.

F.

be

VI

paid

provides

by

Lessee

of Construction and

Lease

See Yurth affidavit. (R. 453 paragraphs 7,

R. 454 paragraph 11, R. 457 paragraph 17, R. 458 paragraph 18, R.
459

paragraph 21, R.

462 paragraph 30) also affidavit of

Rudy

Curinga (R. 464-468).
g.

Neither

sufficient

Defendant

financing

(Yurth deposition,

at

pp.

nor

Plaintiff was

a rate not to exceed
207,

able

to

secure

12% per

annum.

224, 227, 229, 233, 235, 239, 240,

254; Horman deposition, p. 74).
Response.
financing
special
Lessee

is

Defendant
not

misquotes the contract.

prohibited by

the

Agreement.

12% or
It

more

receives

attention - (Interest in excess of 12% is to be paid
[Plaintiff]).

Plaintiff

Also

see

citations

was working on financing when

recorded a contract of sale.

10

related

Defendant

by

to (f.).

unilaterally

h.

Plaintiff

did

not

sufficient

amount,

or

individual

contract

member

account

designated

(Yurth deposition,

any

at any time assign dues
amount

whatever,

income

according

or any other manner

to

a

in
to

special

solely for the payment of lease properties.
pp.

82 & 84; Horman deposition,

pp. 90-91,

181-183.)
Response.
a

trust

A substantial number of memberships were sold and

agreement sent to Defendant.

agreement for deposit.

Defendant did

sign

(Yurth deposition 117.)

Q.
The document you said was prepared in
assign the membership contract to payment
payment into an escrow account and so forth,
you had a copy of that document?
A.

not

order to
of lease
you said

Yes, sir, I do.

Q.
When did you present that to Mr. Horman?
Did I
understand you to say that you gave that to Mr. Horman?
A.
a.

Yes, sir.
The

Plaintiff
assignment
property)

oral

agreement to assign which is alleged

included
the

as

a material condition

precedent

condition that the lessors (the

absolutely

owners

as the new lessee in place of Defendant.
Exhibit 15 to Yurth deposition;

of

Yurth

from

(Paragraph 4 of section

Horman deposition,

pp. 114,

deposition page 198

A.
Yes. He indicated that he was uneasy about it but
that he did say to Mr. Dyer that he had the ability to
assign the lease and that he opened the document and

11

the

assignee

175, 195; Affidavit of Brent Dyer.)
Response.

the

to any

and completely release the Defendant

all obligations under the lease and accept the proposed

1,

by

showed Brent Dyer the specific portions of the document
which enabled him to assign that lease,
Q.
Yurth

If he could be made comfortable financially?
affidavit

(R.

456

paragraphs

14

&

15

also

Clissold

affidavit, R. 498 paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). (See Addendum)
b.

The

lessors

release

the

Defendant from any obligation under

accept

(owners) of the Harver Building
the

did

not

lease

or

the Plaintiff as a new lessee in place of the Defendant.

(Horman deposition, p. 119. )
Response.
c.
master
the

A

The same citations in response to (a.).

material condition precedent to any assignment of the

lease required as a condition precedent

approval

deposition,

by
p.

deposition.)

the

City

of

engineering

192; paragraph

the

(Yurth

15

to Yurth

The engineering studies have never been

completed

(Affidavit of Scott Evans.)

A material condition precedent to any assignment was for

assignee

to get adequate financing

192), which was never provided.
229,

construction

studies.

(2)1, Exhibit

and sent to the City for approval.
d.

to

233,

235,

239,

(Yurth

deposition, p.

(Yurth deposition, pp. 207, 224,

240 and 254; Affidavit of Sherman Gilman,

Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Compciny, Inc. )
Response.

Responses

to

c.

& d.

are the

same

raised in response to Point II.
POINT I
PLAINTIFF, THROUGH COUNSEL, WAS NOT GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY TO ADEQUATELY
RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS OF FACT

12

responses

Thusf
discovery
until

Plaintiff
necessary

after

the

was

told

that

Plaintiff

to Respond to the summary

decision was

entered.

The

could

not do

judgment

motion

affidavits

clearly created by Defendant to support its case.

were

Plaintiff had

no opportunity to conduct discovery related to the alleged facts.
The case is complicated and has resulted in voluminous pleadings.
(Defendant's counsel even apologizes for length of his brief. (R.
323))
Plaintiff

requested

further discovery.

time

and the opportunity

Such request was denied,

to

conduct

and the conducting

of additional discovery would not have prejudiced Defendant.

The

result

the

was

that all of the facts were not and are

not

on

table.
In a similar fact situation, Auerbachs v.
Court,

Kimball, Supreme

State of Utah, November 15, 1977, 572 P.2d 376, the Court

The granting of the motion for summary judgment was
premature, because Kimball's discovery was not then
complete.
It
was the information sought in
the
proceedings for discovery, which Kimball claimed would
infuse the issues with facts sufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment, and sustain his counterclaim.
Whether such would be the case can not now be
determined, because such facts, if they exist were not
allowed to be discovered.
When a motion is made opposing summary judgment, on the
ground discovery has not been completed, the court
should grant a continuance or deny the motion for
summary judgment; unless the motion in opposition is
deemed dilatory or without merit.
If the motion for
summary judgment is denied, the denial should be without
prejudice to its renewal; after an elapse of adequate
time for completion of discovery.

13

It

would

not greatly have delayed the proceedings to

have

allowed the discovery.
The Court in Cox v. Winters 678 P.2d 311 (Utah, 1984) stated
Trial court abused its descretion in denying investors
opportunity to conduct further discovery prior
to
granting attorney's motion for summary judgment...
It

is

axiomatic

that a summary judgment ought not

to be

granted if all facts cannot be placed before the court.
POINT II
ALL POINTS CITED AS CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE
VALIDITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND LEASE AGREEMENT
HAVE BEEN FACTUALLY CONTROVERTED AND THERE ARE
QUESTIONS OF FACT ON EACH OF THOSE CITED POINTS
There
Defendant
did

by

not

provide

is

a

question of fact and

law

about

whether

his acts is estopped from alleging that

Plaintiff

perform engineering studies or that Plaintiff
a trust for membership dues.

In the

the

did

not

alternative, the

Defendant waived the engineering requests as well as those of the
trust.

In

addition,

these

as

well as all other

facts

were

estopped

from

controverted and a question of fact exists.
Plaintiff
alleging

that

pursuant

to

Defendant

alleges

that

the

Defendant

"Defendant has not approved

is

financing."

the affidavits submitted it would appear

unreasonably

refused

to

cooperate

in

Where,
that

obtaining

financing and indeed took steps to impede such financing.
POINT III
ALL POINTS CITED TO SHOW THAT THE PURPORTED ORAL
LEASE IS NOT VALID HAVE BEEN CONTROVERTED IN THE RECORD

14

the

The

affidavits and depositions cited have controverted

the

facts alleged by Defendant and raise reasonable issues of fact.
POINT IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY ONLY BE GRANTED WHERE
THERE IS NO ISSUE OF FACT:
With

respect to Points II and III, the Court is not called

upon to weigh evidence or make findings of fact,
Ott 525 P.2d 620 (Utah, 1974).
required

no issues of fact.

580

23

Ut.
or

v.

The Court is not permitted to nor

to make findings of fact but can only find that

are

weight

Burningham

Carr v Bradshaw Chevrolet Co. 464

2d 415 (Utah 1970) and the

Court

cannot

credibility of witnesses Singleton v.

there
P.2d

consider

Alexander

431

P.2d 126, 19 Ut. 2d 292.
Further,
pleadings,
favorably
summary

to

sustain

evidence,
reviewed

judgment

a motion for

admissions

from

summary

judgment, the

and inferences should be

point of view of

the

party

must show that there is no issue

of

most

opposing
material

fact Frederick May £ Co^ v Dunn 368 P. 2d 266, 13 Ut. 2d 40 (Utah,
1962) See also Bowen v. Riverton City 656 P.2d 434.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

Plaintiff

was

not

given

an

opportunity

to

conduct

discovery necessary to properly place all facts before the court.
2.

The

facts

upon

which

controverted.

15

Defendant

relies

have

been

3.

The

Court is required to determine only that there

no issues of fact.
4.- Review
depositions

must

are

This is clearly not the case.

of

materials

submitted

in

affidavits

be interpreted in the light most favorable

and
to

the Plaintiff.
Based

upon the foregoing,

the judgment should be

reversed

and the case remanded for further discovery and trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1985.

PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS

Lorin N. Pace

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true, correct, and
complete copy of the document to which this certificate is
appended or included was mailed via first class mail with postage
prepaid to the hereinafter designated addressee(s) on the
day of June, 1985:
ADDRESSEE(S):
L. R. Gardiner, jr.
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
American Plaza II - Suite 400
57 West 200 South
P.O. Box 3450
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84110-3450
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CONSTRUCTION

#

AND LEASE AGREEMENT FOR THE DOWNTOWN

ATHLETIC

CLUB

This Agreement executed by and between S. M. HORMAN
AND
SONS, a partnership, hereinafter referred to as "Lessor," and
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, INC*, a Utah corporation, hereinafter
referred to as "Lessee."
In c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the c o v e n a n t s , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and
promises herein reserved and contained on the part of Lessee to
be paid, performed and observed, the Lessor does hereby agree to
lease, perform construction work on, demise and let unto Lessee
the premises hereinafter described, and the Lessee does hereby
hire and take from the Lessor the said premises, upon the following terms and conditions:
I
Premises.
The premises included in this Agreement are
part of the Harver Warehouse Building and/or part of the Kress
Building ^nd/or part of the Grant Building, located in downtown
Salt Lake City, Utah, as more particularly described and shown on
Exhibit A, which is a property description of the building(s) to
be used.
In the event that any or all of said buildings 3re
demolished, the premises shall be located in the new buildings
built upon the same locations where the referenced buildings are
presently located.
II
Occupancy.
It is the intent of the partie's to this
Agreement that Lessee shall have occupancy of the portions of the
"premises" as more particularly described as follows:

A

Harver Warehouse B u i l d i n g — T h e basement location,
ground level, second floor and roof level of the
Harver Warehouse Building location, as more particularly described and shown on the floor plans ^*
attached hereto as Exhibits A(1) through k(5)
f^k/^

B.

Grant B u i l d i n g — T h e portion of the Grant Building
referred to generally as the southeast corner of
the main level of the Grant
Building , as more
particularly
described
and
shown on the
floor
plans attached pereto
as Exhibit B

C
Construction
to make
the
expense
premises as follows:
III

A.

Lessor
following

agrees^ xat its
sole
improvements
to the

cost
and
described

Harver Warehouse B u i l d i n g — L e s s o r
shall
install
all permanent improvements for the basement level,
ground level, second floor, new third floor, and
new roof level of the Harver Warehouse Building
location
including
heating, ventilation,
air
conditioning,
electrical
systems,
plumbing,
sprinkling systems, fire systems, stairways and
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w a l k w a y s , l i g h t i n g , i n t e r i o r and party w a l l s ,
decking, and all engineering, architectural and
structural work related thereto sufficiently to
cause the premises to house the facilities shown
in the floor plan as more particularly described
and shown as floor plans on Exhibits A(1) through
( 4 ) , provided
that the Harver
Building
can be
reinforced at a price that is acceptable to Lessor
and Lessee, and in a manner which will satisfy the
requirements of the Salt Lake City Building Department,
All costs of remodeling and construction shall be borne by Lessor provided, however,
that Lessee shall provide its own leasehold
improvements
and f u r n i s h i n g s on said
premises.
Lessor and Lessee agree and Lessor
understands
that L e s s e e ' s leasehold i m p r o v e m e n t s shall be
considered by the Lessor and Lessee to specifically include, be defined
and shall further be
considered as the Lessee's personal property, all
furnishings,
removable
fixtures,
appliances,
removable equipment and machinery
as more particularly described and shown on Exhibit C.
B.

Grant B u i l d i n g — L e s s o r shall install ail permanent
improvements
for
the main
level
of the
Grant
Building
including
heating,
ventilation,
air
conditioning,
electrical
systems,
plumbing,
sprinkling systems, fire systems, stairways and
w a l k w a y s , l i g h t i n g , i n t e r i o r and party w a l l s ,
decking, and all engineering, architectural
and
structural work related thereto sufficiently to
cause the premises to house the facilities shown
in the floor plan as more particularly described
and shown on Exhibits 8(1) and ( 2 ) , provided that
the Grant Building can be remodeled at a price
that is acceptable to both Lessor and Lessee, and
in a manner which will satisfy the requirements of
the Salt Lake City Building Department.
All costs
of remodeling and construction shall be borne by
Lessor provided, however, that Lessee shall provide its own leasehold improvements and furnishings on said premises.
Lessor and Lessee agree
and
Lessor
understands
that Lessee's
leasehold
impr-ovements shall be considered by the Lessor and
Lessee to specifically include, be defined
and
shall further be considered as the Lessee's personal property, furnishings, removable fixtures,
appliances, removable equipment and machinery as
more particularly described and shown on Exhibit
D.

In addition, the Lessor and
Lessor may modify, change

Lessee understand and
or alter the design

agree that the
specifications

-2-

zs

contained in the floor plans as more particularly
shown on Exhibits A(1) and ( 2 ) , B(1) and ( 2 ) , C and
by applicable governmental and regulatory agencies
obtain building permits and the final certificate
for the project.

described and
D as required
sufficient to
of completion

IV
Performance,
Lessor agrees that the construction of
the improvements described above and as more particularly described and shown on Exhibits A and B shall be commenced not
later than seven
days following confirmed receipt and acceptance
by Lessor of construction financing acceptable to Lessor at the
offices of the lender of Lessor's choice, and shall be completed
within 12 months thereafter*
If there shall be a delay in the
construction or repair of any improvements caused by strikes,
riots, acts of God, shortages of labor or materials, national
emergency, governmental restrictions, laws or regulations or any
other cause or causes beyond either party f s control, such delay
shall not be a violation of this Lease and the time periods set
forth in this Lease 'for any such work shall at such party's
option be extended for a period of time equal to the period of
delay.
Anything to the contrary herein contained notwithstanding, the design and construction of the store front for the
Premises shall be at Lessor's sole cost and expense.
In addition, it is agreed and understood that Lessor shall construct the
improvements called for in this Lease with the understanding that
Lessee shall sell a sufficient number of memberships prior to
completion of the Athletic Club to guarantee that the payments
required by this contract will be paid; Lessee agrees to assign
dues income in a sufficient amount to guarantee said payments
according to individual membership contracts by contract number
to a special account designated solely for the payment of monthly
lease payments due and payable under the terms of this Lease.
These contracts must be acceptable to Lessor and the mortgage
loan company.
V

Lease Term.
A,

The term of the Lease shall be as follows:

Original Term--The
p a r t i e s hereby
agree
that
effective
with
the date of execution
of
this
Agreement that the Lessee shall have the use of
the Premises for the sum of ONE DOLLAR AND MO/100
($1.00) per month with the additional understanding that Lessee agrees to pay for his own utilities.
At such time as the improvements described
in paragraph two are substantially completed, the
permanent term of this Lease shall commence.
The
permanent term shall be for a period of 15 years
commencing after Lessor and Lessee agree improvements to the building are
substantially complete,
and the premises can be occupied by Lessor and
open to the public for business.
The Lease shall
end on the last day of the 15th year.
The $1.00
per month herein refers to the office space in the
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Kress
Building.
If Lessor leases this
Lessee will be required to relocate.
B.

building,

Option to R e n e w — I f the Lessee desires to continue
to occupy the premises for an additional period,
the Lessee shall have successive one year renewal
terms after giving notice to the Lessor, prior to
the expiration of the original term of each prior
renewal period.
Upon such action, the Lessee
shall have a renewal of said Lease for an additional one year period at a rate acceptable to
Lessor.

VI
Lease Payments.
Lease payments for the premises and
improvements described in this Agreement shall be equivalent to
the sum of the following three elements computed and payable on a
monthly basis:
A.

The portion of the monthly amortization of the
permanent
financing attributed to interest over
the initial
15 year lease
period
referred
to
herein; plus
The portion of the monthly amortization of the
permanent
financing attributed
to the principal
sum required in construction of this job, including the prorated amount of land cost, computed as
the declining balance over the initial 15
year
lease period; plus
The monthly charge of $0,085 ($1.00 per year) per
square foot of the leased premises based upon a
total square f o o t a g e of approx imately 64 ,6^0
square feet.
In addition to the above monthly
payments, Lessee shall pay to the Lessor a total
of
$64,000.00
per
year
payable
monthly
at
$5»333.33 to represent the amount of rent Lessor
is required to pay to the owner of the Harver
Warehouse
Building.
In
addition
to
this
$64,000.00, the Lessee will be required to pay an
increase added to this sum of $9t000.00 per
year
making a total of $73,000.00 each year during the
second
five-year period of this lease, payable
monthly, and during the third five-year period of
this
Lease,
this
amount
will
increase
to
$82,000.00
per
year,
payable
in equal
monthly
payments.
It is further agreed that the minimum
rent will be no less than $36,000.00 per month
during the first year and this amount will increase thereafter as herein described.
Cost of Living Index Annual C o m p u t a t i o n — I n addition to the above rent described in Items A and B
herein, Lessee will be required to increase the
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rent described in this Lease equal to any increase
in the cost of living index.
However, this increase will not exceed the sum of eight percent
(85) per year even though the increase in the cost
of living index may exceed that amount.
E.

Security D e p o s i t — T h e Lessee shall remit to Lessor
the sum of $20,000 within 10 days after commencement of construction; the sum of $20,000 within 2
days after construction is certified to be 50?
complete, and the sum of $30,000 on or before
Lessee shall occupy the improved space as specified above.

F.

Acquisition of Sufficient F i n a n c i n g — T h i s Lease is
subject to Lessor being able to secure sufficient
financing to rebuild or remodel as the case may be
the premises to be occupied under the terms of
this Lease at a rate not to exceed 125 (12 percent) per annum, and that Lessee shall pay all
annual
interest
charges
in excess of
125
(12
percent) per annum, provided that if the Lessor
does decide to pay a higher interest rate than
twelve percent (125), the annual interest rate is
acceptable to the Lessee.

VII
Use of Premises.
The premises shall be used and occupied by the Lessee for the purpose of operating an athletic club,
including all uses associated therewith, i-svcluding but not limited to physical exercise, training and conditioning facilities,
restaurants, snack bars, club facilities, and such other uses as
may be reasonably associated therewith.
Lessee shall occupy and
use the premises for this purpose only and no other.
Lessee
shall not make or permit any use of the premises which shall
constitute
a nuisance or which shall cause offensive
odors,
sounds or appearances or which, directly or indirectly, is forbidden by public law, ordinance or governmental or municipal
regulation or order.
Lessee shall at its expense be entitled to
place decorations or other improvements inside the premises and
shall furnish and maintain the same in a good and attractive
condition, at Lessee's expense and risk.
It is understood and
agreed that this is a "triple net" Lease in which zhe
Lessee
agrees to assume full responsibility for the payment of ail taxes
(particularly
including
but not
limited
to property
taxes),
insurance and maintenance of the Harver Building, or for any
other improvements located in any other building occupied
by
Lessee.
Lessee shall occupy and use the premises in a lawful
manner complying with all laws and ordinances of the State of
Utah, the City of Salt Lake, the county of Salt Lake, and all
rules and regulations of the Board of Fire Underwriters for Salt
Lake City, State of Utah.

come,

VIII Parking.
The Lessor shall provide parking on a firstfirst served basis to accommodate the customers of the
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Lessee with respect to the premises described in this Agreement.
Lessor agrees to provide access to the Harver Parking Terrace for
the members, customers and guests of the Downtown Athletic Club
on the same basis as other tenants of the Kress Building, Grant
Building, and other adjoining buildings to the premises described
in this Agreement.
Utilities.
The Lessor shall until substantial
comIX
pletion of construction and remodeling of the premises pay all
utilities within and upon the premises and thereafter
Lessee
shall be responsible for and shall promptly pay all charges for
use or consumption of separately metered heat, sewer, water, gas,
electricity or any other utility services from the date of commencement of the lease term, with the understanding that Lessor
shall make provisions to separately meter water, gas, electricity
and other utility services consumed by Lessee.
X
Indemnification.
The Lessee shall indemnify Lessor and
save it harmless from suits, actions, damages, liability and
expense in connection with loss of life, bodily or personal
injury or property damage arising from or out of the use or
occupancy of the premises or any part thereof, or occasioned
wholly or in part by any act or omission of Lessee, its agents,
contractors, employees, servants, invitees, licensees or concessionaires, whether occurring in or about the leased premises
but excluding the-common areas and facilities or elsewhere within
the premises.
Lessee shall not be liable for damage or injury
proximately caused by the negligence of Lessor , or its agents,
servants or employees.
This obligation to indemnify shall include reasonable attorneys fees and investigation costs and all
other reasonable costs, expenses
and liabilities from the first
notice that any claim or demand is to be made or may be made.
Lessor shall not be responsible or liable to Lessee or to those
claiming by, through or under Lessee, except in the event of
negligence for any loss or damage to either the persons or property of Lessee that may be occasioned by or through the acts or
omissions of persons occupying adjacent, connecting or otherwise
adjoining premises,
Lessee shall be responsible for any defect,
latent or otherwise, in any of the equipment, machinery, utilities, appliances or apparatus in the building and shall be responsible and liable for any injury, loss or damage to any person
or to any property of Lessee or other person caused by or resulting from bursting, breakage, or by or from leakage, or failure of
fire sprinklers.
Lessor shall not be responsible or liable for
any loss or damage to either the persons or property of Lessee
which may be caused by leakage of steam or snow or ice, running,
backing up, seepage or the overflow of water or sewerage in any
part of said premises, or for any injury or damage caused by or
resulting from acts of God or the elements, or for any injury or
damage caused by or resulting from any of said premises, the
building, machinery, apparatus or equipment by any person or by
or from the acts or negligence of any other occupant of the
premises.
Lessee shall give prompt notice to the Lessor in case
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of fire or accidents in the premises or in the
defects therein or in any fixtures or equipment.

building

or

of

XI

W a i v e r of S u b r o g a t i o n ,
The Lessor and the Lessee
hereby waive any rights each may have against the other on account of any loss or damage occasioned to the Lessor or the
Lessee, as the case may be, their respective property, the premises, or its contents, or to other portions of the premises,
arising from any risk generally covered by fire and extended
coverage insurance; and the parties, each on behalf of their
respective" insurance companies, insuring the property of either
the Lessor or the Lessee, against any such loss, waive any right
of subrogation that it may have against the Lessor or the Lessee,
as the case may be.
XII
Lessee's Insurance.
The Lessee further covenants and
agrees that, from and after the earlier of the commencement date
of the term hereof or the commencement of any business by the
Lessee in the premises, it will carry and maintain, at its sole
cost and expense, the following types of insurance in the amounts
specified
and in the form hereinafter provided
for:
Bodily
injury liability insurance with limits of not less than ONE
MILLION DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($1,000,000.00) per person and TWO
MILLION DOLLARS AND N0/100 ($2,000,000.00) ?er occurrence insuring against any and all liability of the insured with respect to
said premises or arising out of the maintenance, use of occupancy
thereof, and property damage liability insurance with a limit of
not
less
than
TWO
HUNDRED
THOUSAND
DOLLARS
AND
NO/100
($200,000.00) per accident or occurrence.
All such bodily injury
liability insurance and property damage liability insurance shall
specifically insure the performance by Lessee of the indemnity
agreement as to liability for injury to or death of persons and
injury or damage to property described herein.
XIII Lessee's Improvements,
The Lessee further
covenants
and agrees that, from and after the earlier of the commencement
date of the term hereof or the commencement of any business by
the Lessee in the premises, it will carry and maintain insurance
covering all of Lessee's leasehold
improvements, alterations,
additions or improvements, trade fixtures, merchandise and personal property from time to time in, on or upon the premises, in
an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of their full replacement costs from time to time during the term of this Agreement, providing protection against any peril included.within the
classification "Fire and Extended Coverage," together with insurance against sprinkler damage, vandalism and malicious mischief.
Any policy proceeds shall be used for the repair or replacement
of the property damaged or destroyed unless this Agreement shall
cease and terminate under the provisions described herein.
XIV
Lessor T s Insurance.
The Lessor shall at all times from
and after the commencement date of the term hereof maintain in
effect a policy or policies of insurance covering the building of
which the premises are a part, in an amount not less than ninety
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percent (90S) of full replacement costs for sprinkl er damat g e ,
vandalism and malicious mischief.
The Lessor's obi igation to
carry ting insurance provided for herein may be brought within the
coverage of an y so called blanket p-ollcy or policies 01f insurance
carried and maintained by Lessor, providead that th e coverage
afforded will not be re duced or diminished by reason of the use
of such blanket po• licy insurance.
Lessee agrees to pay Lessor
for such insurance withi n 30 days a fter billing.
XV
Increase in Insurance Premiums.
Lessee agrees that it
will not at any time during the term of this Agreement carry any
stock or goods or do anything in or about the premises which will
in any way tend to increase the insurance rates upon the building
of which the premises are a part.
The Lessor acknowledges and
agrees that there will be restaurants on the premises and such
use shall not be considered to be an increased insurance cost or
cause of cancellation of Lessor's insurance.
The Lessee agrees
to pay to the Lessor forthwith upon demand the amount of any
increase in premiums for insurance against loss by fire that may
be charged during the term of this Agreement on the amount of
insurance to be carried by Lessor on the building of which the
premises are a part resulting from the foregoing or from Lessee
doing any act in or about said premises which does so increase
the insurance rates.
If due to the occupancy, abandonment, or
Lessee's failure to occupy the premises as herein provided, any
insurance shall be cancelled by the insurance carrier or if the
premiums for any such insurance shall be increased, then in any
of such events the Lessee shall indemnify and hold Lessor harmless and shall pay on demand the increased cost of such insurance .
XVI
Destruction of Leased Premises.
If the premises are
partially damaged by any casualty insurable under the Lessor's
insurance policy, Lessor shall, upon receipt of the insurance
proceeds, repair the same, and the applicable monthly
lease
payment of the premises shall be abated proportionately as to
that portion of the premises rendered untenantable.
If the
premises by reason of such occurrence are rendered wholly untenantable, or should be damaged as a result of a risk which is not
covered by the Lessor's insurance, or should be damaged in whole
or in part during the last three (3) years of the term or any
renewal term hereof, or the building (whether the premises are
damaged or not) should be damaged to the extent of fifty percent
(50$) or more of the then monetary value thereof, or damaged to
such an extent that the premises cannot be operated as an integral commercial unit, then or in any of such events, Lessor may
either elect to repair the damage or may cancel this Agreement by
notice of cancellation within one hundred eight (180) days after
such event and thereupon this Agreement shall expire, and Lessee
shall vacate and surrender the leased premises to Lessor.
Lessee's liability for rent upon the termination of this Agreement
shall cease as of the day following the event or damage.
In the
event Lessor elects to repair the damage insurable under Lessor's
policies, any abatement or rent shall end five (5) days after
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notice by Lessor to Lessee that the leased premises have been
repaired.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to abate
percentage lease payments, but the computation of such payments
shall be based upon the revised minimum lease payments as the
same may be abated.
Unless this Agreement is terminated
by
Lessor, Lessee shall repair and refixture the interior of the
premises in a manner and to at least a condition equal to that
existing prior to its destruction or casualty and the proceeds of
all insurance carried by Lessee on its property and improvements
shall be held in trust by Lessee for the purpose of said repair
or replacement.
XVII Condemnation of Leased Premises.
If the whole of the
premises shall be acquired or taken by eminent domain for any
public or quasi-public use or purpose, then this Agreement and
the terms hereof shall cause and terminate in any such event.
If
any part of the premises shall be taken as aforesaid, and such
partial taking shall render that portion not so taken unsuitable
for the business of Lessee then this Agreement and the terms
hereof shall cease and terminate as aforesaid.
If such partial
taking is not extensive enough to render the premises unsuitable
for the business of Lessee then this Agreement shall continue in
effect except that the minimum lease payment shall be reduced in
the same proportion that the floor area of the premises (including basement) taken bears to the original floor area demised and
Lessor shall, upon receipt of the award in condemnation, make all
necessary repairs or alterations to the building so as to reconstitute the portion of the building not taken as a complete
architectural unit, but such work shall not exceed the scope of
the work to be done by Lessor in originally constructing said
building, nor shall Lessor in any event be required to spend for
such work an amount in excess of the net amount received by
Lessor as damaged for the part of the demised premises so taken.
"Net amount received by Lessor" shall mean that part of the award
in condemnation proceedings which is free and clear to Lessor of
any collection by mortgagees for the value of the diminished fee.
If more than twenty (20) percent of the floor area of the premises shall be taken as aforesaid, Lessor may, by written notice to
Lessee, terminate this Agreement, such termination to be effective as aforesaid.
If this Agreement is terminated as provided
in this paragraph the lease payment shall be paid up to the day
that possession is so taken by public authority and Lessor shall
make an equitable refund of any lease payment paid by Lessee in
advance.
XVIII Award.
The Lessee shall not be entitled to and expressly waives all claim to any condemnation award for any taking, whether whole or partial, and whether for diminution in
value of the leasehold or of the fee, although Lessee shall have
the right, to the extent that the same shall not reduce Lessor's
award, to claim from the condemnor, but not from Lessor, such
compensation as may be recoverable by Lessee in its own right for
damage to Lessee's business and trade fixtures, if such claim can
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be made separate and apart from any award to Lessor and without
prejudice to Lessor's award.
XIX Right to Re-Enter.
If the Lessee shall default in
payment of the lease payments reserved hereunder for a period of
twenty (20) days after any of the same shall have become due and
payable as aforesaid, or if Lessee shall abandon or appear to
abandon the premises or fail to conduct business therein for a
period of seven (7) consecutive business days, or if default
shall be made by Lessee in any of the other covenants and agreements herein contained to be kept and fulfilled on the part of
the Lessee (except with respect to the defaults specified herein)
for a period of twenty (20) days after written notice of such
default is given by the Lessor to the Lessee without action by
the Lessee to remedy such default and continuance of such action
to remedy such default to conclusion with reasonable diligence or
if the Lessee makes any transfer, assignment, conveyance, sale,
pledge or disposition, of all or a substantial portion of its
property or removes a substantial portion of its personal property from the- premises other than by reason of an assignment or
subletting of the premises permitted under this Agreement, or if
the Lessee's interest herein shall be sold under execution then
and forthwith thereafter the Lessor shall have the right:, at its
option and without prejudice to its premises, or the Lessor,
without such re-entry may recover possession of the premises, ana
that after default be made in any of the covenants contained
herein, the acceptance of lease payments or failure to re-enter
by Lessor shall not be held to be a waiver of its right to terminate this Agreement, and the Lessor may "re-enter and take possession thereof the same as if no rent had been accepted after such
default.
All of the remedies given to the Lessor in this paragraph or elsewhere in this lease in the event of default by
Lessee, are in addition to and not in derogation of all other
rights or remedies to which Lessor may be entitled under the laws
of the State of Utah, and all such remsdies shall not be deemed a
waiver of any other or further rights or remedies.
XX
Maintenance.
Lessee shall be responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of all heating, ventilating, air
conditioning, plumbing and electrical systems on said premises
and all interior maintenance of the building; in addition, Lessee
shall be responsible for all plumbing, mechanical, electrical 3nd
other maintenance related to swimming pools, and other special
use equipment installed by Lessee.
XXI Bankruptcy.
To the full extent permissible under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, specifically Section 365 thereof
(11 U.S.C. 365) or any successor thereto, if Lessee shall file a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy or take the benefit of any
insolvency act or be dissolved or adjudicated a bankrupt, or if a
receiver shall be appointed for its business or its assets and
the appointment of such receiver is not vacated within sixty (60)
days after such appointment, or if it shall make an assignment
for the benefit of its creditors then and forthwith thereafter
-10-

the Lessor shall have
event of non-payment,

all

of

the

rights

provided

herein

in

the

XXII Quiet Enjoyment.
Lessee, upon payment of the lease
payments and performing all of the terms on its part to be performed, shall peaceably and quietly enjoy the premises.
XXIII Force Majeure.
The parties shall be excused for the
period of any delay in the performance of any obligations hereunder, when prevented from so doing by cause or causes beyond
their control which shall include, without limitation, all labor
disputes, civil commotion, war, war-like operations, invasions,
rebellion, hostilities, military
or usurped
power,
sabotage,
governmental regulations or controls, fire or other casualty,
inability to obtain any material or services or through acts of
God.
Nothing contained in this paragraph or elsewhere in this
Agreement shall be deemed to excuse or permit any delay in the
payment of any sums of money required hereunder, or any delay in
the cure of any default which may be cured by the payment of
money.
Mo reliance by Lessee upon this paragraph shall limit or
restrict in any way Lessor's right to self-help as provided in
this Agreement.
No party shall be entitled to rely upon this
paragraph unless it shall advise the other party in writing of
the existence of any force majeure preventing the performance of
an obligation within fifteen (15) days after the commencement of
the force majeure.
XXIV Enforcement of Lease Expenses.
If it becomes necessary
for either party hereto to enforce the covenants of this Lease,
the defaulting party will pay to the other party all costs and
attorney's fees that shall arise from enforcing this Agreement.
XXV Strict Performance.
It is mutually agreed
that the
failure of the Lessor or the Lessee to insist upon strict performance of any of the covenants, restrictions or conditions of
this Agreement, or to exercise any option herein covered, in any
one or more instances, shall not be construed as a waiver or
relinquishment of any such covenants, agreements, conditions or
options, but the same shall be and remain in full force and
effect.
XXVI Binding Effect.
It is further mutually covenanted and
agreed that all covenants, agreements, conditions, stipulations,
recitals and options or elections herein contained to be kept and
performed by or given to and to be exercised by either party
shall bind and inure to the benefits of the legal representative,
successors and assigns of such party and to grantees of the
Lessor, excepting that no assignment by or through the Agreement
in violation of the provisions of this Agreement shall vest any
rights in the assignee.
XXVII Notices. Notices and demands hereunder or pursuant to
any statute or ordinance now or hereafter enforced
shall be
validly and sufficiently served, given or made if mailed in a
-1 1

sealed envelope, postage prepaid, and if intended for the Lessee,
addressed to the Lessee at 257 South Main Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, or if intended for the Lessor, addressed to the Lessor at
1760 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, until either party
shall designate by written notice a new address to which any such
notice or demand shall thereafter be so addressed and mailed.
XXVIII Remedies.
All rights and remedies of the Lessor or
Lessee herein enumerated
shall be cumulative, and none shall
exclude any other right or remedy allowed by law.
XXIX General Provisions.
No receipt of money by the Lessor
from Lessee after the termination of this Agreement or after the
service of any notice or after the commencement of any suit, or
after final judgment for possession of the premises shall renew,
reinstate, continue or extend the term of this Agreement or
affect any such notice, demand or suit.
The words "Lessor" and
"Lessee" wherever used in this Agreement shall be construed to
mean Lessors or Lessees in all cases where there is more than one
Lessor or Lessee, and the necessary grammatical changes required
to make the provisions hereof apply either
to corporations,
partnership or individuals, men or women and shall in all cases
be assumed as though each case was fully expressed.
Provisions
inserted herein or affixed herto shall not be valid unless appearing in the duplicate original hereof held by Lessor.
In
event of variation or discrepancy, Lessor's duplicate original
shall control.
The captions here are inserted only as a matter
of convenience or for reference. and in no way define, limit or
describe the scope of this Agreement or the intent of any provision therein.
XXX Governing Law.
This Agreement shall be construed, and
the rights and obligations of the Lessor and Lessee shall be
determined according to the laws of the State of Utah.
The parties to this Agreement
XXXI Recordation,
the Lessee shall not record this Lease.

their
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Lorin V. Pace # 2498
G. Randall Klimt # 1839
William B. Parsons # 2535
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI AND PARSONS
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterplaintiff
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB
University Club Building, Suite 1200
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vS. M. HORMAN, an individual, a/k/a
SID HORMAN, S. M. HORMAN & SONS,
a Partnership, and S. M. HORMAN &
SONS COMPANY,

C i v i l No. C83-6545
(Judge David B. Dee)

Defendants.

S . M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,

Defendant and
Counterplaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID YURTH

-vDOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
c o r p o r a t i o n , and DAVID G. YURTH,
and i n d i v i d u a l ,
Counterdefendants.

STATE OF UTAH

|

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

|

I :SS
Comes

now the undersigned affiant,

being first duly sworn

hereby deposes and says as follows:

1

under

oa

1.

My name is David Yurth.

I am a resident

currently

residing at 9642 Kelly Brook Drive.

Executive

Officer

of

of Salt Lake City, Utah,

I am the President and

the Downtown Athletic Club,

Inc.,

which

is

Chief
a

Utah

Corporation.

2.

In the summer of 1980 I approached Mr.

Horman to determine whether

space in the Harver Warehouse Building could be made available for the purpose
of constructing and operating an athletic club.

After some

negotiations,

I

entered into a verbal agreement with Mr. Horman under which I would be allowed
to

occupy

the

Main Street portion of the Kress Building at 257

South

Street to begin the sales of memberships in the facility which Mr.
I agreed was to be built in the basement,

third,

Main

Horman and

fourth and fifth floors

of

the Harver Warehouse.

3.

Prior to the sale of memberships,

condition
of

the

Mr.

Horman and I agreed that on

that sufficient memberships could be sold to guarantee the
venture;

that a co-maker of acceptable financial strength

success
could

be

persuaded to guarantee payment of the lease for an athletic club; that permits
could

be

obtained

agreeable

for the construction of such a

facility;

financing could be obtained to pay for the costs

of

that

mutually

improvements;

that I would assign in trust monthly dues revenue from the membership sales to
guarantee payment of the lease;
of

at

least

$20,000

Downtown Athletic Club,
agreed

to;

Street

Level

completed;

that

and

of

and that I obtain an operating line of credit

to insure that the start-up costs could
that Mr.

be

borne

Horman would build the improvements we

Downtown Athletic Club would be allowed to occupy the
the

Kress Building until

the

project

that Downtown Athletic Club would obtain a

2

was

by
had
Main

substantially

written

contract

which

reflected the terms of our verbal agreement upon my having verified

to

him that I had satisfied the conditions of our verbal agreement.

4.

After

obtaining

having

sold

nearly 1,000 memberships by January

a suitable guarantor for the lease;

credit line which was agreed to;
Building

at

having obtained the

his

no cost to me since August 1980;

agents

Housing

for

1981;

operating

occupying the Main Street level of the Kress
and having arrived at

agreement on the improvements to be constructed in the warehouse,
and

of

applied to the Salt Lake City

Department

of

a

Mr.

firm

Horman

Building

a permit to build the International Marketplace Specialty

which was to have included the athletic club improvements.
ads

in nationally circulated shopping center trade

the

International

Marketplace

and
Mall,

Mr. Horman placed

publications

advertising

which listed the Athletic Club as

the

prime

tenant.

5.

After

Warehouse,

inspecting

WT Grant,

the

subject

property,

including

American Theater and Kress Buildings,

the

the application

for

a building permit for the specialty mall was denied on the

Mr.

Horman

and

his construction crews had performed substantial

which

had

structurally damaged the

work

without

proper

building

permits,

buildings,

which

which were in violation

grounds

were
of

I

attended

meetings

held

by the Hearing

and

Appeals

that

demolition
conducted

the

building code, and for which no engineering records had been kept.
and

Harver

uniform

Mr. Horman

Board

of

the

Department of Building and Housing in the City Council Chamber of the City and
County

Building in the early spring of 1981. After

appeal

for waiver,

Inspector
on

the appeal was denied.

Mr.

reviewing

Roger Evans,

Mr.

Horman1s

City

Building

was instructed by the Board to issue a permit for construction only

condition

that Mr.

Horman conduct engineering studies to

structural and seismic integrity of the subject property.

3

determine

the

6.
had

By May of 1981, Mr. Horman was satisfied that Downtown Athletic Club

sold

without

sufficient
requiring

agreement

to

drafted,
for

memberships to guarantee the

that

govern

the

the

success

lease be guaranteed by

assignment of monthly

a

of

the

co-maker.

memberhsip

dues

venture
A

trust

had

been

reviewed by the loan officer at my bank, and submitted to Mr. Horman

review

and

execution on May 8,

1981.

Mr.

Horman and

I

executed

a

construction and lease agreement for the purpose of building the athletic club
in Harver Warehouse.
time
and

The only conditions which had not been completed at the

of the execution of the agreement were the assessment of the
siesmic

acquisition

integrity

of

the

building by

of a construction loan.

a

licensed

structural

engineer

and

the

The executed agreement reflected

every

material term and condition to which we had agreed orally in August 1980.

7.

I

responsible

understood and the agreement states that Mr.
for

retaining and paying the engineers who were to

requisite studies.

if

Mr.

interest

to

conduct

be
the

I understood and the agreement states that Mr. Horman was

to provide the construction funds,
and

Horman was

Horman

and that if the funds were to be borrowed,

was to be the borrower,

charges up to 12% per annum,

that he would

pay

the

and that Downtown Athletic Club

annual
would

pay any interest charges in excess of that.

8.

Mr. Horman did not retain a licensed engineer to conduct structural

and siesmic studies.
licensed
prepare
Mr.

or

He engaged an employee, Mr. William Smith, who is not a

qualified engineer and who was an employee

an estimate for the City Building Department.

Roger

Evans,

of

Mr.

Horman,

to

After conferring with

I was told that the results of any report prepared by

Mr.

Smith would not be acceptable for the purposes of obtaining a building permit.
I told Mr.

Horman as much, and when he refused to hire a licensed engineer, I

4

hired one myself.

Our construction and lease agreement required Mr. Horman to

retain a licensed engineer and pay for the engineering studies.

I desribed to

Mr. Grant Talbot, the retained engineer employed by Bonneville Engineering the
extent of the studies to be performed and instructed him to invoice Mr. Horman
for

the

agreed

costs incurred.

I informed Mr.

Horman that I had done so

that Bonneville Engineering was acceptable as a contractor to

and

he

provide

that service.

9.

Mid-way thru the studies I had occasion to consult with Mr.

regarding

his progress.

I was appalled to discover that his

were based on the data supplied to him by Mr.
Smith.

I

Mr.

Bonneville

Horman1s employee,

results

Mr. William

confirmed this observation in personal conversations with both Mr.

Horman and Mr.
work.

study

Talbot

Smith,

Horman

and subsequently notified Mr.

Talbot to terminate his

refused to pay for the engineering services

Engineering,

rendered

by

and after receiving several billing notices from Mr.

Talbot I instructed Corporate Counsel V. Dabney to send him a letter.

10.

Mr.

assignment

did not execute the trust agreement provided for

of monthly dues revenue.

modifications
and

Horman

to the agreement.

Nor did he ever suggest any

changes

I personally delivered the document to

was unable to execute the trust document because it required his

approval.

the
or
him

written

The approval was never given, nor did I ever obtain a satisfactory

reaction from him of any kind relative to the document.

11.
several

During
occasions

venturers,

equity

this period,
to

bring

from May 81 to September 81,
to

Horman1s

Mr.

attention

potential

on

joint

partners and construction lenders in an on-going effort to

provide a satisfactory source of construction funds.
time

I attempted

Mr. Horman never at any

to ray knowledge made a legitimate attempt to obtain a construction

5

loan

for

the

project,

even

though

he agreed and

the

agreement states that he was responsible to do so.

construction

and

lease

No loan commitment of any

kind was ever obtained through his offices for the athletic club project, even
though I had repeatedly demonstrated performance on all the conditions of

the

construction and lease agreement.

and

12.

Within

lease

agreement I delivered,

envelope

a week to ten days after the execution of the construction

containing

personally,

to

Mr.

Horman1s

office

$100 in cash and a receipt which I had prepared to

an
meet

the terms of our agreement for payment of $100.00 per month for rental of
space.
the

Mr.

Horman

explained that the $100 per month charge was included in

agreement to satisfy the requirements of the company providing

casualty insurance on the building.
to

Horman1s

Mr.

office

and

fire

was given a signed copy

of

the

receipt.

made,

August 5,

I

traced, or in any way

attempted to affix a fabricated signature to that receipt for payment.
was

and

Within a day or two thereafter I returned

categorically deny that I or anyone of my staff forged,

demand

the

1983 for Downtown Athletic Club to

vacate

Until
the

property, Mr. Horman never mentioned the matter of payment again.

13.

In September, 1981, I held meetings with Mr. Horman in his office in

which we discused his willingness to build the athletic club as he had agreed.
Downtown Athletic Club's legal counsel sent letters to him,
acknowledged,
demanding

that

affirming
Mr.

our

demonstrated

which were

performance under the

Horman proceed with construction as

agreed.

never

lease

and

When

Mr.

Horman told me that he would not build the athletic club, I convened a meeting
in

his office which was attended by a number of contractors and officers

for

the Downtown Athletic Club. The purpose of the meeting ws to validate Downtown
Athletic Club's performance under the construction and lease agreement, and to

6

come

to an agreement with Mr.

Horman that would result in the completion

of

the project and avoid my having to file a law suit to enforce the contract.

14.

After reviewing the status of the project,

Mr. Horman and I agreed

that if I was able to solve the engineering questions and obtain
financing

through

my own resources that he would assign his master lease

the Harver Warehouse in its entirety to Downtown Athletic Club,
agreed

construction

Inc.

abandoned.

its

It was

that Downtown Athletic Club would be allowed to continue to occupy the

Kress Building without further payment until the project was either
or

in

own

It was agreed that Downtown Athletic Club was free to

architect,

subcontractors
project.

completed

general contractor,

engineers,

lenders and

engage

agents

or

of whatever variety was necessary to effect completion of

the

Mr. Horman required and I agreed, as did my Board of Directors, and

subsequently

both

of Downtown Athletic Club's lenders,

to hold

Mr.

Horman

harmless and indemnify him against any recourse whatsoever by any creditor
Downtown
terms

of

of

Athletic Club for any defaults in the payment or performance of
the

master

lease.

It was agreed that the

assignment

executed prior to the closing of any construction loan.

the

would

be

The terms of payment

were

agreed to and Mr.

Horman wrote them in pencil on the top of

the

first

page

of a copy of the master lease agreement.

with

a statement to the effect that he hoped I could make it work so he could

He handed the document to

me

stop making payments on a building that he had no use for.

15.

Mr.

Horman

indicated on a number of occasions that he would

preferred to assign the master lease with a release of his lessee
from

the

property owners,

that

the

Carlson

circumstances.

He

but also repeatedly told anecdotes to

family was altogether unwilling
agreed

to

do

to consider a variety of other

that,

obligations
illustrate
under

any

alternatives,

and

subsequent to the oral agreement we had to assign the lease did agree to

7

have

sign

an

assignment

of the lease to Downtown Athletic Club which did

not

that he be released from the master lease by the property owners.

require

Having the

Carlson's release him from the master lease was never a condition precedent to
his assigning it to Downtown Athletic Club.

16.
provide

In October of 1981 I engaged the firm of Cornwall, Evans and Fife to
architectural

asked

and design services for Downtown

Club,

them to contract with a structural engineer to develop the

analysis
Webber,

required by the City Building Department,,
Structural Engineer,

and he conducted,

Cornwall,

Mr.

Evans,

Ronald Webber,

and Mr.

Ronald

completed, and submitted the
In December,

Mr.

Shirl

Scott Evans met in the offices of Mr.

Chief Building Inspector for Salt Lake City.

recommendations of the study were discussed,
architects

and

engineering

They engaged Mr.

completed engineering analysis to them in November,,

Roger

Athletic

The results

and

and Mr. Evans is reported by the

to have approved the recommendation for structural

reinforcement,

estimated

to cost approximately $100,000 (rather than $150,000 per

suggested

by Mr.

Grant Talbot of Bonneville Engineering).

I

floor

as

conveyed this

information personally to Mr. Horman and indicated that I was going to proceed
with all possible speed to obtain a construction loan.

17.

Within

30

days after completion of the engineering

prime interest rate had reached 21%.
would

be

therefore
facility

some
agreed

I knew,

time before the rate would drop
that

of

to

affordable
temporary

in the basement and ground floor of the Kress

1982 and operated until June of 1983.
that interim facility,

did Mr.

the

and Mr. Horman agreed, that it

I could proceed to build a

terms of the construction and lease agreement.

studies,

levels.
athletic

Building,

under

We
club
the

That facility opened in March,

Never, at any time during the operation

Horman,

8

his agents or his legal

counsel

-'nstruct me to remove it from the premises, notify me of any default or defect
in my performance of the lease terms, or notify me verbally or in writing that
the

lease

was

terminated.

In all respects and at

all

times

Mr.

Horman

conducted his business affairs with me as if the lease were in full force
effect,

and

in

accordance

with

that

agreement,

Downtown

and

Athletic

Club

maintained his properties, paid for repairs to the heating & plumbing systmes,
replaced

glass broken from the doors by vandals,

repaired the elevators

and

sprinkling system which froze in the winter, paid for the heating and lighting
of

properties,

vandalism

and

and

continually

illegal

policed the area to prevent and

trespass.

Downtown

Athletic

Club

deal

with

provided

these

services because I had agreed with Mr. Horman to do so*

18.

In May,

1983,

Champion Mortgage Company of San Diego, California,

after a thorough review of all pertinent documents and an on-site

inspection,

provided Downtown Athletic Club with a contract guaranteeing to pay $5,000,000
to

the

construction

construction loan.
I

notified

Mr.

lender

after

24

months from

the

issue

it

of

a

Inasmuch as Downtown Athletic Club was to be the borrower,

Horman

that

the take-out

commitment

had

personally delivered a copy of the contract to his office,
Dabney,

date

been

obtained,

and instructed Mr.

Downtown Athletic Club's corporate counsel, to inform Mr. Horman that

was my intent to complete the project.

master

lease

as

Mr.

Horman had agreed.

He requested an assignment of
Mr.

Horman did

not

execute

the
an

assignment nor did he respond to Mr. Dabneyfs notice verbally or in writing.

19,

In June of 1983, after receiving notice of Downtown Athletic Club's

take-out commitments,
purchase
lease

to

etc.,

Mr.

Horman executed a contract for the sale and

of the subject properties,

along with an assignment of

the Harver Warehouse and Parking Garage with Mr.

Paragraph ^l

of that agreement is an acknowledgment by both

9

the

William
parties

master
Selvage.
that

a

current, valid and enforceable lease contract and oral agreement to assign the
master

lease

to

Downtown Athletic Club was in existence at

contract was executed.
Athletic

Ray Gardiner,

even though he repeatedly agreed to do so.

existence of this contract until November,
filed

time

that

A copy of that agreement was not provided to Downtown

Club or my legal counsel by L.

defendant,

the

1983.

Jr.,

counsel for the

I did not discover the

At that time

Mr.

Selvage

a notice of contract against title to the property to prevent

Downtown

Athletic Club's loan from closing.

20.
letter

In August,

1983,

denying that an agreement to assign the master lease had been

into by the Defendant,
any

of

its

notifying

us

that

under the construction

Downtown

1983.

a

entered

alleging that Downtown Athletic Club had not performed

obligations

September 1,
and

counsel for the Defendant sent to my attorney

Athletic Club was to

and

least

vacate

agreement,
the

premises

and
by

The letter also set forth the conditions which Mr. Horman

I had agreed to for an assignment of the master lease,

and Mr.

Gardiner

confirmed to my legal counsel that if Downtown Athletic Club could demonstrate
that those conditions had been met, an assignment of the master lease could be
obtained.

21.

On

construction
Maurice

August
loan

Green

in

30,

1983,

I received a letter of

the amount of $5,000,000.

of Transamerica Mortgage Company.

commitement

for

The letter was

issued

It stated

terms

the

a
by
and

conditions under which the loan would be funded, and identified the time frame
within

which

commitment
conveyed

the

closing

would occur.

had been obtained,

I notified

Mr.

Dabney

supplied him with appropriate copies,

notice of the receipt of the commitment,

confirmation

of

that
and

the
he

Downtown

Athletic Club's performance of the terms stipulated in Mr Gardiner's letter of

10

August

5 (and pursuant to Mr.

Gardiner's verbal confirmation of the letterfs

terms on September 2, 1983 to Mr. Dabney), and a draft assignment agreement to
Mr. Gardiner.

22.

One day later,

understand
proceed

why

I

Mr.

Gardiner responded in writing that he did

had sent the data to him,

denying that he had

with execution of the lease assignment,

agreed

and demanding that I

not
to

vacate

the Kress Building.

23.

Mr. Dabney responded, in a letter which I believe was hand-delivered

to Mr. Gardiner, that there had indeed been a clear commitment to proceed with
the

assignment as agreed.

Mr.

Dabney also stated that he was

that I retain co-counsel since it was obvious that Mr.
upon to testify if litigation were to ensue;

recommending

Dabney would be called

he also advised Mr.

Gardiner to

do the same.

24.

When it became obvious that Mr.

Horman was totally unwilling,

reasons which were still very unclear at the time,
and

Downtown Athletic Club,

and

conditions

commitments
contacted
with Mr.

of

to
B.

Dabney.

and

the construction

Ray Zoll,

me

after I had verified my performance of the terms

construction

fund

to assign the lease to

for

lease
of

attorney at law,

agreement,
the

and

scheduled

had

acquired

improvements.

I

and asked him to act as co-counsel

After talking with Mr. Gardiner and corresponding with him,

Mr."Zoll advised that we file a Lis Pendens against the property and prepare a
verified complaint, which we did.

25.

Over the next 60 days,

assignment with Mr. Gardiner.
document.
recall

As

clearly

I

Mr.

Zoll negotiated the terms of the lease

Mr. Gardiner insisted that his office draft the

recall the document was redrafted nearly 20
that

many

if not all of the redrafts

11

were

times,
the

and

result

I
of

arbitrary
arrived

and

completely inappropriate modifications to the

at in the negotiation process.

most

frustrating experience.

used

the

oral

agreement

The drafting of that document was

I am convinced that Mr.

Gardiner

a

deliberately

redrafts to provoke us to spend exhorbitant amounts of capital

for

sole

purpose of depleting my funds and causing me to withdraw

from

the

26.

When

the agreement had finally been redrafted and modified to

the

the
case.

point that both Mr.

Horman and I had agreed to execute it,

on or about November 18 to sign the contract.

we agreed to meet

On or about November 16 or 17,

Mr.

Gardiner called, and said he had discovered that a lien had been filed on

the

property

Acquisition

by Mr.
Group,

William Selvage,

acting on behalf of

Salt

Lake

Land

and characterized the lien as a notice of contract.

Mr.

Gardiner denied any prior knowledge of an agreement to convey the property
Mr.

Horman to Mr.

them

Selvage,

by

but repeatedly stated that any agreement between

had expired on its face,

was null and void,

and should not prevent us

from executing our agreement of assignment.

27.

Mr.

Gardiner

Zoll

requested

a copy of the

repeatedly

confirmed

his

agreement,

willingness

to

and

provide

although
it,

he

Mr.
never

delivered the document.

28.
dilemma

I personally met with Mr. Selvage to explore ways of mitigating the
posed

agreement
and

in

later

SLLAG's

by his filing of the notice of

relocate

block

Arthur,

We

negotiated

which Downtown Athletic Club would occupy the Harver
its operations to

development

liens from the property.
Sam

contract.

an

suitable

alternative

plan in exchange for both groups

an

Warehouse

facilities
removing

in

their

Mr. Zoll reviewed the terms of the greement with Mr.

attorney in Denver who represented SLLAG,

12

and when

it

was

determined
complete

that the agreement was satisfactory in- principle,
set

agreement.
review,

documents

These

to

reflecting

documents

modification

responded
answer

of

and

the terms

were sent to Mr.

execution

a phone call.

conditions

Arthur and

Mr.

November.

Neither

in late

the submittal in writing,

and

we drafted
of

that

Selvage

nor would either of them

The agreements were not executed,

the

for

of

them

return

and the liens

or
were

left in place.

29.

Mr.

Gardiner

was

requested by Mr.

Zoll to assist me

in

having

SLLAG1s lien removed so that we could proceed with the execution of our
assignment.

30.

lease

He flatly declined to do so.

In

December

I notified both Champion Mortgage and

Mr.

Green

at

Transamerica that I had arrived at an impasse with Mr. Horman and Mr. Selvage.
Mr.

Green

then sent me a letter which laid the blame for the failure of

loan to close squarely at Mr.
the
it

Horman and Mr.

Gardiner's feet,

the

alleging that

agreement was drafted so unconscionably in favor of the Lessor as to make
wholly

commitment

unacceptable to any lendor,
would

irrevocably

notifying me that 30 days

expire unless the

impasse

could

hence

the

somehow

be

resolved.

31.

Being

left with absolutely no recourse,

serve process on Mr.

I instructed Mr.

Zoll to

Horman, which he did on the 90th day after the filing of

the verified complaint.
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Further the affiant saith not.

i day of December, 1984.
DATED this (p-C"

DAVID YURTH
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

\Q

day of December, 1984

My Commission Expires:

Notary BgMic

LL*.

Residing At: S- L.C^jkf,

V

LlM,

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

I

hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing

Affidavit was hand delivered this

day of December, 1984, to:

L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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Lorin N. Pace # 2498
G. Randall Klimt # 1839
William B. Parsons # 2535
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI AND PARSONS
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterplaintiff
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB
University Club Building, Suite 1200
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vS. M. HORMAN, an individual, a/k/a
SID HORMAN, S. M. HORMAN & SONS,
a Partnership, and S. M. HORMAN &
SONS COMPANY,

Civil No. C83-6545
(Judge David B. Dee)

Defendants.
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,
Defendant and
Counterplaintiff,
-vDOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH,
and individual,
Counterdefendants
STATE OF UTAH
:SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
1

AFFIDAVIT OF
RUDY CURINGA

Comes

now the undersigned affiant,

being first duly sworn under

oath, and hereby deposes and says as follows:
1.

My name is Rudy Curinga.

I am a resident of Salt Lake

City, residing at 2960 East Willow Creek Drive, Sandy, Utah 84092
engaged
estate

in

the

business of real estate

financing.

business

I

am

self-employed and

under the license of R.R.

since March, 1984.

development
have

Curinga &

and

real

operated

Associates,

my
Inc.

Prior to incorporating, I operated as a d/b/a

for 4 years in this capacity.
2.

In the late fall of 1982,

I was referred to Mr. David

Yurth, President of the Downtown Athletic Club by a realtor named
Frank L.

Bandt. I was requested to act on behalf of the Downtown

Athletic

Club

financing

to

obtain construction and

long

term

for the proposed athletic club project in

mortgage

the

Harver

Warehouse, located on Block 57 in Salt Lake City.
3.

I reviewed the development package and its descriptive

documents,
with
obtain

Champion
a

financing.
issued

and

to

during the winter and spring of 1983
Mortgage

suitable
In

on Downtown Athletic Club's

stand-by take-out commitment for

May of 1983 a stand by take-out

Downtown

Athletic Club by

completion of their on-site inspection.

2

Champion

negotiated
behalf
long

commitment
Mortgage

to
term
was

after

4.

In

Maurice
and

August of 1983f

Green,

Mr.

Yurth and I negotiated

with

a loan officer for Transamerica Occidental Life,

obtained a letter regarding a construction load

request

in

the amount of $5,000,000.
5.
funded

The
by

letter indicated that the loan would actually be

a correspondent lender,

and that

lender may require that an off-setting deposit,
to

the loan itself,

the

correspondent

not hypothecated

but equal to the actual face amount of

the

construction loan,

be deposited with the lending institution for

the

loan in order for the

term

of

the

interest

rate

to

be

established at a fixed rate.
6.

I agreed to make arrangements to place such off-setting

deposits in the lending institution issuing the contruction loan,
and confirmed to Mr.
Branch

of

Martin Morrow, manager of the Beverly Hills

Imperial Savings and Loan,

telephone,

that

in writing and

over

the

I would arrange such a deposit under terms

and

conditions to be negotiated prior to closing.
7.

With

business,

to

compensating

my

experience

the

deposits

best

of

in
my

the

real

knowledge

estate
the

financing

mechanics

was workable and practical and

that

of
the

term and conditions and practices were consistent with the normal
practices

of

lender in the marketplace,

3

and that I

could

and

would

have

provided

the off-setting deposit

if

it

had

been

been,

an

employee,

required.
8.
officer

I

am

not now,

nor have I ever

or director of the Downtown Athletic Club.

engaged to act on their behalf as a contract agent,

I have been
and have

at

all times acted independently in this matter.
Further the affiant saith not.
DATED this tp ^day of December, 1984.

_..JNGA
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me th
1984
My Commission Expires:

6^l\-Z~]

Notary Flblic

ResidingJAt: S.L C^iy f (iU

467

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I
and

hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing

Affidavit

was hand delivered

this

above

day

of

December, 1984, to:
L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

5

463

August 30f 1983

Mr. Frank Hargrove, Jr.
Associated Legal Services
Newport Irvine Center
Newport Beach, California

92660

Res Maurice Green, Transamerica Mortgage Company
Dear Mr. Hargrove,
Mr. Green and I have been in quite close contact over
the past two to three weeks regarding interim financing for
a project to be built in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Mr. Green is in receipt of a loan package and loan
request in the amount of $5,000,000.00 for a 2^-month term.
Rate of interest and fees are to be negotiated.
Pursuant to Mr. Greenfs request, this letter will confirm
to you my offer and suggestion to Mr. Green to arrange for
$5f000,000.00 to be deposited into an institution of your
selection (F.D.I.C. or F.S.L.I.C. insured) and setting the
interest rate for the construction loan on a "net spread"
basis versus floating. A 24-month Certificate of Deposit
would be taken back.
I will be happy to discuss this with you at length.
Best regards,

Rudy R. Curinga
RRCskf
cci Mr. Dave Yurth

S

| # SENDER: Completettems1.2.3. and 4.
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space
on reverse.
(CONSULT POSTUASTER FOR FEES)
1. The following service is requested (check one).
Q Show to whom and date delivered
~~~.
D Show to whom, date, and address of delivery..
I. a RESTRICTED DEUVERY

fI

{The restricted delivery fee k charged in addition to
the return receipt fu.)

TOTAL
l ARTICLE ADDRESSED TO: fzffrwj*

4. TYFE OF SERVICE:
D REGISTERED QMSURED

jSOERmED

*_

H¥H?b*Q</ir , TiT.

ARTICLE NUMBER

QcOO

O EXPRESS MAM.

e^.

(Always obtain signature of addressee or agent)
I have received the article described above.
SIGNATURE D Addressee
• Authorized agent

PS Form 3800, Feb. 1982

O
m

IPT

S.)'DATfel Ofcfl£lJVERY
Uw^staV

O
V
m

t , ADDRESSEE'S ADDRESS {Only
«
if requested)

20
T
7. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:

7a. EMPLOYEE* t

~o
->

;"*"*
C

C

o

r-

en
oo
o

UNITES STATES POSTAL SERVICE
SENOSR INSTRUCTIONS
•
•

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE
UttTOAWSPAYMBfT
• F POSTAGE, f t t t

CMffetoam!,t4*tf4Mfeir*«»t.
Attcbtolrwttefitfcfctfipaeiptnnits,
uuMiiifina 10 WMOT «•!*<*>

RETURN
TO

An,

A ^ <yz

(Nante of Sender)

/Safrg (/;a^n^i^
(Street or P.O. Box)

S> 0 T\ Pj

(Qfy, State, and ZIP Code)

R.R. CURINGA AND ASSOCIATES

September 20, 1983

[v'.r. Martin Morrow
Imoerial Thrift & Loan Association
85~^9 Wilshire Blvd.
Beverly Kills, California 9g
Downtown Athletic Club, $aiu Lake City, Utah
AND
^
"'
Kr. Maurice Green, Transamerica Mortgage Company
AND
Matching; Deposits
Dear Mr. Morrow,
This letter is being sent to you at the request of
Mr. Green regarding the above referenced project which is
to be built in the downtown business district, Salt Lake
City.
Mr. Green is the recipient of a loan package reflecting
a construction loan request in the total amount of $5,000,000.00
over a 2h month period. A Stand-3y/Take-Gut Commitment has
been secured for a like amount.
In an effort to fix the cost of money going in, this letter
will confirm my offer to Mr. Green to arrange for $5#000,000.00
to be deposited in your institution for a 2 year period at a
fixed rate.
It would be cur suggestion that the construction lean
would be on a "net spread" basis versus a prime + ana floating.
Please advise if I may be of further assistance to you.
Best regards,

Rudy R. Curinga
RRCikf
cc: Maurice Green, Transamerica Mortgage Comoany
David Yurth, President, Downtown Athletic Club

TELEPHONE (801) 942-2822 • 1528 E. WATERS LAME • SANDY, UTAH 84092

/

^N

UTAH M

•'

5288 Soutr-.

st S.m

;RPCR«

:)8P0 Box 7727

Mr.rt.-;,Kio Bankers Since 189

>N

Mi:rrnv Ut.ih ^-l 10^
Phono 8 0 r . T ^ •: r 1

\
'•^-sa**

July 2 2 , 1983
Mr. Rudy Curinga
1528 E. Water LN
Sandy, UT 84092
Re:

Downtown Athletic Club;
Champion Mortgage-Standby

Commitment

Dear Rudy,
Please be advised that the undersigned is interested in presenting the interim financing proposal on the Downtown Athletic
Club to our loan c o m m i t t e e , when we have the assurance to our
satisfaction of the source of funds and the availabilitv of funds
for the funding of the standby c o m m i t m e n t .
A l s o , we have not
been presented with financial statements on the b o r r o w e r , which
must be in our file and approved by us before presentation to our
loan c o m m i t t e e .
Thank you for given us the opportunity to review this
and look forward to hearing from you f u r t h e r .
Very truly y o u r s ,
UTAH ffORTGAGE LOAN

CORPORATION

M. Vincent J o r g e n s e n ,
Vice President
Income Property Financing
MVJ :erg

Division

proposal,

LORIN N. PACE #2498
WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I #2535
G. RANDALL KLIMT #1839
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

DEC18J984
H. Di
By

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-oOoDOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vsS.M. HORMAN, an individual, aka
SID HORMAN, S.M. HORMAN & SONS,
a Partnership, and S.M. HORMAN
& SONS COMPANY,

EXTRAORDINARY REQUEST
FOR REVIEW

Defendants.

S.M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,
Defendant and Counterplaintiff,
-vsDOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUBf a Utah
Corporationf and DAVID G. YUKIH,
an individual,

Civil No. JC83-6575(Judge David B. Dee)

Defendants.

COMES NCW the Plaintiffs by and through their attorneys of record Lorin
N. Pacef William B. Parsons III and G. Randall Klimt and request the Court to

take the extraordinary step of allowing counsel for the Plaintiffs to address
the Court relative to their Motion to continue the Motion for Summary
Judgment in light of the fact that counsel for the Plaintiffs have only
yesterday been appointed to the casef are without the opportunity because of
the time constraints of having sufficient time to notice up a Motion in
advance of the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendants, and represent
that the Motion for a continuance is well founded and based upon the logic of
that which is in the better interest of justice and the substantial legal
reasoning that the case is not new ripe for Sunraary Judgment as represented
in their arguments and documents on file herein.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs regret the inability to properly notice a
Hearing in conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure but request this
extraordinary opportunity to address these issues with the Court at the time
place and date set for Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment for the
reasons above stated.
DATED this

("

day of

,

, 1984.

PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI "£\PAFSONS

. >7

By:

^ U ' t i w ) \ ^ - w > x j_<^
William B. Parsons III

S571

HfiND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Extraordinary Request for Review was hand delivered this
, 1984, to:

L.R. Gardiner Jr.
POX, EDWARDS St GARDINER
American Plaza II, Suite 400
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

, ,

A

lH

day of

FILED IN CLERK'S OFrlCi
Salt Lake County Utan

LORIN N. PACE #2498
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535
G. RANDALL KLIMT #1839
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300

DEC 18 1984
H. Dixjon Hiridley, Gierk 3rdDist. Court
By —Srj'U'y-f>"v'
Deputy Cierx

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0DOWNTCWN ATHLETIC CLUB,
a Utah Corporation

]
]

Plaintiff,
-vsS.M. HORMAN, an individual, aka
SID HORMAN, S.M. HQRMAN & SONS,
a Partnership, and S.M. HQRMAN
& SONS COMPANY,

]
I
]

MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

]
]

Defendants.

S.M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,
Defendant and Counter plaintiff,

£83^-5^
i
i

-vsDOWTCWN A3HLETIC CLUB, a Utah
Corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH,
an individual,
Counterdefendants.

Civil No.- C83^6575 •
(Judge David B. Dee)

]

]

COMES NCW the Plaintiff by and through their attorneys of record PACE,
KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS and moves the above entitled Court for an Order

continuing Defendants1 Motion for Sumnary Judgment from November 16, 1984, at
the hour of 8:30 a.m. until some further date in time as shall be mutually
convenient to the parties or as shall be set by the Court.
This Motion for a continuance is based upon the Affidavit of Lorin N.
Pace submitted herewith and based upon the representation of counsel for the
Plaintiff that they are, as of the 13th day of November, 1984, newly retained
as counsel for the Plaintiff, that the case has considerable magnitude,
considerable complexities, in that the Motion for Summary Judgment Memoranda
provided by counsel for the Defendants is such that it can hardly be
responded to in the short period of time between this date and the 16th day
of November 1984 and that the case is not ripe for a Summary Judgment in that
counsel for the Plaintiff have given notice to the Court of the intention to
depose nine additional persons at least and require a reasonable period of
time in which to complete those depositions and further counsel for the
Plaintiff have given notice to the Court of their need for time to
intelligently and legally proficiently respond to Defendants' Motion for
Sumnary Judgment.
DATED this

. 3

day of

*v $"

, 1984.

PACE, KLIMT,

By:(

ERLI & PARSONS

/\f^<^~

"TiOrin N. Pace

HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-

going Motion for Continuance was hand delivered this

/Q day of

A(?(

1984, to:
L.R. Gardiner Jr.
POX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
American Plaza II, Suite 400
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

fU n

th'.a (/i.

KL-

FILED >N CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

LORIN N. PACE #2498
WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I #2535
G. RANDALL KLIMT #1839
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300

DEC 1 8 1984
H Dfeo^maley Ofcik 3rd Onx Court

By \ ,'tfy, \

.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-oOoDOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vsAFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL
S.M. HQRMAN, an individual, aka
SID HQRMAN, S.M. HORMAN & SONS,
a Partnership, and S.M. HORMAN
& SONS COMPANY,
Defendants.

S.M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,
Defendant and Counterplaintiff,
J>

-vs-

Civil NO.-CQ3 6575 »
(Judge David B. Dee)

DOWTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
Corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH,
an individual,
Counterdefendants.

STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

I, Lorin N. Pace, being first duly sworn do hereby depose and say that:

1.

I am lead counsel for the firm of PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS

who has now been retained to represent the Dcwntcwn Athletic Clubf a Utah
Corporation in the above entitled matter.
2.

I and my firm have new received majority of the materials held and

maintained by prior counsel for the Plaintiff in this proceeding but have not
had the opportunity of reviewing all of the materials and have only new in
fact just obtained the pleadings and a portion of the depositions.
3. We have not received critical depositions there having not been in
the possession apparently of our predecessor counsel and have not had any
opportunity to review or respond to the lengthy memoranda in support of the
Motion for Summary Judgment produced by POXf EDWARDS & GARDINERf counsel for
the Defendants in the above entitled proceeding.
4.

As a firm we are willing to proceed vigorously with the prosecution

of this case, have no desire to delay the samef and desire only to provide
our clients the best legal representation that we can, however, we find it
physically impossible to intelligently and sufficiently respond to the Motion
for Summary Judgment that J.s set for the 16th day of November 1984 at the
hour of 8:30 a.m.
5.

I would represent that I and iny firm would be capable of responding

to the Motion for Sunmary Judgment readily within forty-five (45) days of the
date set for the hearingf however, we anticipate the taking of nine (9)
additional depositions including the depositon of Ray Gardiner Jr., of taking
an additional or completing the deposition of Sid Horman, primary Defendant
in these proceedings, and thus represent in this Affidavit that discovery is

neither complete nor close to completion.
As indicated we could respond to the technical issues in the Motion for
Summary Judgment but we make no representation as to whether or not the
discovery can be completed within said forty-five (45) days.
Further the affiant saith not.
DATED this

/.^

day of

fccd.

, 1984.

PACE, KLIMT^WNDERLI & PARSONS

Lorm N. Pace

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

G

day of

1984

NCAJ

tkj. fin ii
if (ruXU
(niA
Nol&ry Public?
My Commission Expires:

3 -£ Ll- %1

Residing At: R L

CB^JJ,

i

li-Ui

HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE,
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Affidavit of Counsel was hand delivered this ^
1984, to:
L.R. Gardiner Jr.
FOXf EDWARDS & GARDINER
American Plaza II, Suite 400
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

day of

AJ0\J

Lorin N. Pace # 2498
G. Randall Klimt # 1839
William B. Parsons # 2535
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI AND PARSONS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Counterdefendants
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB
University Club Building, Suite 1200
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vS. M. HORMAN, an individual, a/k/a
SID HORMAN, S. M. HORMAN & SONS,
a Partnership, and S. M. HORMAN &
SONS COMPANY,

Civil No. C83-6545
(Judge David B. Dee)

Defendants
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,
Defendant and
Counterplaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD CLISSOLD

DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah
corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH,
and individual,
Counterdefendants.
STATE OF UTAH
:SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Comes

now the undersigned affiant,

being first duly sworn

hereby deposes and says as follows:
1

under

oath,

1.
Lake

My name is Richard Clissold.

City,

Clissold

Utah,

and

Investment

am

I am a resident of Salt

the owner and

sole

proprietor

Company which has numerous and

of

diversified

interests.
2.

In

charter

the late fall of 1980, I purchased

memberships

Downtown

on

a

Athletic Club.

constructed

on

the

deferred

payment

ten

lifetime

contract

in

the

The proposed facility was to have been

site of the Harver

Warehouse

Building

in

downtown Salt Lake City.
3.

In the fall of 1981, I was asked by Mr. David G. Yurth,

President

of the Downtown Athletic Club,

development
guarantor

of
of

acquainted

to assist him

his project by participating as a

his lease on the property.

with

the

project

and

with

After
Mr.

in

the

co-maker

and

having
Yurth,

become
I was

satisfied that the proposed Athletic Club had sufficient merit to
warrant my investigating the project as a possible investment

of

my own.
4.

Prior to my meeting with Mr. Yurth and with Mr. Horman,

the lessor of the property,

Mr. Yurth supplied me with numerous

sets of documents describing the project, including blueprints, a
copy

of

Club,

the contract between Mr.

a membership list,

Horman and Downtown

income and expense

Athletic

forecasts, market

surveys, a feasibility study and a variety of other documents. I
reviewed
Yurth,
could

those
and

documents, discussed them at

length

with Mr.

subsequently agreed to provide whatever assistance I

to evaluate numerous financing alternatives which had been
2

proposed

to

complete the project.

I also agreed

to

consider

becoming a co-guarantor of the lease.
5.

In

late

September of 1981,

I met in the offices

Horman Construction Company in Salt Lake City,
Edward,
that

Mr.

Sidney Horman, and Mr. Yurth.

meeting

problems
rates,

associated
he

was

athletic club.
the

Mr.

Utah with my

of
son

During the course of

Horman said that because of
with the building and the

uncomfortable with the delays

the

engineering

rising
in

During the course of the meeting,

interest

building
we

the

discussed

possibilty of assigning the master lease on the property

Downtown

Athletic Club so that they could complete the

to

athletic

club project with their own resources, rather than Mr. Herman's.
6.

Mr.

integrity

of

Horman said he was concerned about the structural
the

building and

wanted

additional

engineering

studies completed before assigning the lease.
7.
about
to

Mr.

further indicated that he

concerned

the owners of the property if he was to assign the
Athletic Club.

solutions
Horman

to

We discussed a variety of

the problem.

It was my

understanding

lease

to

alternative
that Mr.

agreed to assign the master lease of the Harver Warehouse

Downtown

Athletic

Club

financing for construction;
questions
and

was

any continuing liability he would have for making payments

Downtown

to

Horman

if

they

could

obtain

their

own

if they could answer the engineering

to the satisfaction of the City

Building

Department;

on condition that Downtown Athletic Club would agree to hold

him harmless, and satisfy him with co-guarantors of the lease.

8.

In subsequent conversations with Mr. Yurth over the next

two years, particularly in the fall of 1983,
learn that Mr.
the
to

I was surprised to

Horman had refused to complete the assignment of

lease to Downtown Athletic Club after it had been
him that 1) financing was finally

project;

confirmed

available to complete the

2) that the engineering requirements had been met; 3)

and that the lenders had agreed to indemnify Mr. Horman as a part
of the assignment of the master lease.
9.
of

I served for nearly two years as a member of the Board

Directors

During
all

of Downtown Athletic Clubr

that time I found Mr.

his dealings with me,

from

1981 to 1983.

Yurth to be honest and truthful in

and can attest

without

equivocation

that he worked diligently to complete the project.
Further the affiant saith not.
DATED this

day of Deceml

^-^r^

* .A/7 '

.

RICHARD Ci^SSOLD"
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this /

u

day of DecemEer,

1984
My Commission
I \ r _E x p i r e s :

7 {Q h^

\6h PUDIIC
ft VUIO)^ 2±, ,
Notary

LlJj^Uy/
;
*

Residing At: ,A/A H' kjUJ

4

fyitiXH.

FILED IN CLBRK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

^ JAN 23 1985
H frxon Hfndley. Ctark 3rd pest Court
By . i
•
•j
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC
CLUB,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO. C-83-6545

Plaintiff,
vs.
S. M. HORMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
The above-captioned matter came on before this Court on
defendants 1

Motion for Summary Judgment, coupled with requests

by the plaintiff

for continuance on the grounds and for the

reason that the counsel representing the plaintiff had withdrawn,
and coupled with a subsequent letter from plaintiff individually
representing himself, Mr. Yurth, that he was unable to get counsel,
it has been continued because of the difficulties

in securing

counsel, giving counsel an opportunity to prepare the defense,
and for other reasons, with final documents having been filed
with this Court by plaintiff

the 10th of December, 1984, and

responsive documents having been filed with the Court December
17, 1984. Requirements under Rule 56 that there needs be "genuine,"
"material" issues of fact raised by defendant on five grounds,
and that the plaintiff has failed to meet the five grounds of
the agreement between plaintiff and defendant, and for this
reason plaintiff's case must be dismissed.

The Court was required
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because of the voluminous materials presented, some 70 pages
and 23 cases requiring extensive Court time for reviewing and
evaluation, thereby making it impossible for the Court to meet
Rule 56 requirements of forthwithness, and the Court finds:
1.

That the defendants 1 Motion to Strike the unsigned

affidavits of some of the plaintiff's affiants should be granted.
2.

The Court finds that the portions of Mr. Yurth's affidavit

based on hearsay and unsubstantiated

facts should be stricken

and defendants1 Motion is granted in that regard.
3.

Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Dated this

23rd

day of January, 1985.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following this

23

day of January, 1985:

Lorin N. Pace
Attorney for Plaintiff
136 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
Attorney for Defendants
57 West 200 South
P. 0. Box 3450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

7

PrTc^i lCl!Xv>^

L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148)
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterplaintiff
American Plaza II, Suite 400
57 West 200 South
P. 0. Box 3450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3450
Telephone: (801) 521-7751
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C 83-6545
(Judge David B. Dee^

Plaintiff,
-vS. M. HORMAN, and individual,
a/k/a SID HORMAN; S. M. HORMAN,
& SONS, a Partnership; and
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,
Defendants.
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY,
Defendant and
Counterplaintiff,
-vDOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB,
a Utah corporation, and
DAVID G. YURTH, an individual,
Counterdefendants.

ORDER
and
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendants f Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly
for hearing, pursuant

to notice, on

November

16, 1984.

The

plaintiff was represented at the hearing by Mr. Lorin N. Pace, Mr.
William B. Parsons III, and Mr. G. Randall Klimt, of the firm of
Pace, Klimt, Wunderly & Parsons.

Mr. L. R. Gardiner, Jr., and Mr.

David B. Thomas, of the firm of Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown,
represented the defendants.
At the hearing, plaintifffs counsel presented to the Court a
motion

to

extend

time

for hearing

on

judgment and also presented a motion

the motion

for

summary

for extraordinary

review,

requesting that the motion to extend time for hearing be heard
even though proper notice had not been given as required by the
rules.
the

Although neither of said motions was in the file before

Court

defendants
served

and proper
indicated

upon

him

respectively, he

notice

had

nor

been

given,

counsel

for

that although these motions had only been

three
had no

and

two

days

objection to

before

their being

the

hearing,

heard.

The

plaintiff's motion for extraordinary review was therefore granted
and arguments were presented on plaintifffs motion to continue
hearing

on

the motion for

summary

judgment.

Noting

that the

plaintiff had had an extraordinarily long time for preparation for
this hearing, the motion for summary judgment having been filed
and served on July 19, 1984, and a substantial extension of time
having

previously

been

granted,

and

there

being

no

adequate

showing as to why the matter should be further continued, the
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court denied the motion to continue the hearing but, after hearing
arguments of counsel on the motion for summary judgment, did grant
the plaintiff
written

an additional twenty days within which to file a

memorandum

in

opposition

to

the

motion

for

summary

judgment.
The time for filing of a memorandum by the plaintiff would
have expired on December 6, 1984, but an additional extension of
time until December 10, 1984, was granted.

Counsel for plaintiff

did, however, file on December 6, 1984, a motion to compel the
deposition of Mr. S. M. Horman and an affidavit of plaintiff's
counsel in support of that motion.

Defendants' counsel filed on

December 7, 1984, a responsive affidavit.
The plaintiff

filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion

for Summary Judgment on December 10, 19 84, together with eight
affidavits, two of which are unsigned and unsworn.

Defendants

timely filed a reply memorandum on December 17, 1984, together
with

a

motion

seeking

an

motion

for

order

to

strike

certain

of

the

which

was

affidavits.
Plaintiff's

extraordinary

review,

granted at the November 16, 1984, hearing and plaintiff's motion
to continue hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which was
denied at the November

16, 1984, hearing are hereby confirmed.

There remain three motions for disposition by this
Summary Judgment:
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Order and

1.

The plaintiff's "Motion to Compel Discovery" which seeks

to take further deposition of defendant S. M. Horman;
2.

The defendants1 "Motion to Strike Affidavits";

3.

The defendants1 "Motion for Summary Judgment."

In rendering

this order and judgment the following matters

are particularly noted:
The motion for summary judgment was filed and served

by the

defendants on July 19, 1984, and at that time a notice of hearing
was also filed and served giving notice of hearing on August 28,
1984, thereby giving 42 days notice of hearing.

A memorandum and

seven supporting affidavits were filed and served simultaneously
with the motion.

Thereafter, approximately one week before the

scheduled hearing, Mr. B. Ray Zoll, who was then counsel for the
plaintiff in this case, presented to the Court an ex parte motion
for permission to withdraw as counsel and for extension of time
for the plaintiff to obtain other counsel and to respond to the
motion for summary judgment.
by

written

order

prepared

The court granted that motion and,
by

counsel

for

plaintiff,

granted

plaintiff sixty days within which to obtain other counsel and to
file a proper response to the motion for summary judgment.
No
period,

appearance
and

judgment.

no

of

counsel

response

On October

was

was

filed

made
to

within

the

the motion

26, 1984, the defendants

sixty-day

for

summary

served a notice

pursuant to Section 36, Chapter 51, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated,
requiring the plaintiff to appear by counsel or in person.
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A

notice of hearing was served on November
motion

for summary

2, 1984, setting the

judgment to be heard on November

16, 1984.

Prior to the appearance of Mr. Pace as counsel in this case, the
court received from Mr. David Yurth a letter reciting, among other
things, that he had contacted a number of law firms but had been
unable to obtain representation.
It

is

also

noted

that

the

deposition

of

plaintiff fs

president, Mr. Yurth, was taken in this case on April 2, 1984, and
that plaintiff took the deposition of defendant S. M. Horman on
April

26, 1984.

Plaintiff's

taking of

the deposition

of Mr.

Horman on April 26, 1984, appears to have been the last activity
of the plaintiff in this case prior to the hearing on the motion
for summary

judgment and the entrance of the appearance of Mr.

Pace three days before that hearing.
The

Court

has

necessarily

taken

more

time

than would

be

suggested by the mandate of Rule 56 that summary judgment, where
appropriate, be granted "forthwith," because of the desire to give
plaintiff ample opportunity to properly respond to the motion and
because of the necessity to review the extensive memorandums and
affidavits filed.

Having now considered arguments of counsel, the

affidavits, memoranda, and other pleadings, and having previously
rendered a memorandum decision, this Order and Summary Judgment is
now entered to formalize the rulings.
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In ruling upon the plaintiff's mction to compel discovery, it
is noted that the deposition of Mr. Horman was taken in this case
by previous counsel for plaintiff on April 26, 1984.

Plaintiff,

during the entire time that the motion for summary judgment was
pending, made no further effort to take further deposition of Mr.
Horman or to undertake any further discovery until the filing of
various

notices

of

taking

depositions

three

days

before

the

hearing on the motion for summary judgment on November 16, 19 84.
The affidavit
specific

filed by plaintiff's counsel

does not state any

area of inquiry that is essential to a ruling on the

motion for summary judgment or that is otherwise relevant to this
action and which was not inquired into in the prior deposition.
There is, therefore, no adequate showing that the Court's prior
order

denying

altered,

and

plaintiff's
there

is

no

motion
adequate

for

continuance

showing

that

should

there

be

is any

information material to a disposition of the motion for summary
judgment that has not previously been covered
deposition heretofore taken of Mr. Horman.

in the extensive
The

Court, having

considered said motion and affidavits, hereby denies the motion to
compel further deposition of Mr. Horman upon the ground that the
motion is contrary

to the previous order of the court denying

continuance of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and
upon the ground that nothing in the motion or affidavit in support
thereof shows any adequate grounds or basis for the granting of
said motion.
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In ruling upon the defendants1 motion to strike certain of
the affidavits filed by plaintiff, it is noted that the documents
headed

"Affidavit

of

Maurice

Green"

and

"Affidavit

of

Grant

Squires" are unsigned and unsworn, that the "Affidavit of David
Yurth as to the affidavits of Grant Squires, Maurice Green and
Todd Marx" is an improper affidavit seeking to introduce thereby
the testimony contained in otherwise unsigned affidavits, and that
the other affidavit of David Yurth contains conclusions of law,
hearsay

evidence,

and

admissible in evidence.

other

statements

which

would

not

be

Even without defendants1 motion strike,

said affidavits are not in accordance with the requirements of
Rule 56(e) and therefore could not in any event be considered in
ruling upon the motion for summary judgment.
considered the

The Court, having

motion to strike and the affidavits to which it is

directed, hereby grants the motion to strike, and the purported
affidavits of Grant Squires and Maurice Green, the affidavit of
David Yurth pertaining to the Squires and Green affidavits, and
the portions of the affidavit of David Yurth to which the motion
is directed are hereby stricken.
Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported, as provided in the rule, which is the case
here, the response must

set forth

specific

there is a "genuine" issue for trial.

facts

showing that

Rule 56 requires judgment

if there is no "genuine" issue as to "material" facts.

The motion

for summary judment has been amply supported, as provided in the

-7-

rule, and shows that there can be no genuine issue that plaintiff
has failed to comply

with several

conditions precedent

in the

agreements upon which plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the
alleged

oral

agreement

or

modification

requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

fails

to

meet

the

The plaintiff's response

has not shown that there is a genuine issue as to any material
fact,

and

the motion

granted.

There

judgment,

and

for

summary

judgment

must

is no just reason for delay
summary

judgment

in

favor

therefore

be

in entry of this
of

defendants

on

plaintiff's complaint should be entered at this time.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that

the plaintiff's

motion

to

take

additional

deposition

of

defendant Horman is denied; the defendant's motion to strike the
affidavits of Maurice Green, Grant Squires, the affidavit of David
Yurth pertaining

to those

affidavits, and

the portions of the

second Yurth affidavit specified in said motion is granted, and
said affidavits

and portions of the Yurth affidavit are hereby

stricken; and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the
defendants and
action,
prejudice

and

against the plaintiff on

the

and

complaint

plaintiff

herein

shall

take

is

the complaint
hereby

nothing

judgment shall now be entered.
DATED this

(£> day of io^ary, 1985.

in this

dismissed

thereby,

and

with
this

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the foregoing Order and Summary
Judgment was served upon the plaintiff and counterdefendants
herein by mailing

a true and correct copy thereof to Lorin

N. Pace, of the firm of Pace, Klimt, Wunderly & Parsons, 1200
University Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
day of January, 1985.
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